Collaborative Decision Making on Climate Change in the Federal Government by Siegel, Joseph A.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 1 Special Edition 2009-2010
Environmental Interest Dispute Resolution: Changing
Times--Changing Practice
Article 8
September 2009
Collaborative Decision Making on Climate
Change in the Federal Government
Joseph A. Siegel
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph A. Siegel, Collaborative Decision Making on Climate Change in the Federal Government, 27 Pace
Envtl. L. Rev. 257 (2009)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
SIEGEL  
 
257 
ARTICLE 
 
Collaborative Decision Making on Climate 
Change in the Federal Government 
JOSEPH A. SIEGEL*
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),1 issued in 2007 revealed the 
immediacy of climate change and the urgent need for swift action.  
According to the Report, the United States and other 
industrialized nations must reduce their emissions by at least 
80% below 1990 levels by 2050 and 25-40% below 1990 levels by 
2020 to prevent atmospheric carbon concentrations from reaching 
a level of 450 parts per million (ppm) and causing the most 
dramatic effects of climate change.2
 
* Joseph A. Siegel is an Alternative Dispute Resolution Specialist and 
Senior Attorney for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 2 Office 
in New York and an Adjunct Professor at Pace Law School. The author wishes to 
acknowledge Deborah Dalton, David Batson and Elissa Tonkin, of EPA’s conflict 
prevention and resolution program, for their invaluable assistance in 
contributing to the ideas for this article. The author also expresses gratitude for 
the excellent research assistance of Jill Richardson, and deep appreciation for 
the support and advice of Sharon Kivowitz. The views expressed in this article 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency. All errors are the responsibility of the author. 
  Recent studies have shown 
that the industrialized nations may need to do even better.  Since 
the issuance of the Fourth Assessment Report, there have been 
advances in climate science and many scientists now believe that 
 1. The IPCC was established by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and is 
the leading international body for assessment of climate change. See 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/ 
organization.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).  
 2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GROUP III, 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 MITIGATION 776 (Bert Metz 
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/ 
wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter13.pdf. 
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the situation is more dire than what was reported by the IPCC.3  
Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, Chairman of the IPCC, stated in August 
2009 that he personally believes, as a scientist, that the global 
atmospheric concentration goal should be 350 ppm, rather than 
the less aggressive 450 ppm that formed the basis of the IPCC’s 
2007 recommended reduction levels.4  It is now likely that sea 
level rise will be greater than predicted due to a faster melting of 
the ice sheets, temperature increases will be far more irreversible 
than thought, permafrost will melt faster than projected thereby 
releasing more greenhouse gases, and the carbon dioxide 
emissions growth rate will track the most pessimistic scenarios 
examined by the IPCC.5
The global findings of the IPCC and others have been 
complemented by findings of the U.S. Global Change Research 
Program (USGCRP), specific to the United States.  According to a 
June 2009 report of the USGCRP, the United States is already 
experiencing the effects of climate change and such effects are 
only expected to worsen.
 
6  The report revealed that the nation is 
already being subjected to “increases in heavy downpours, rising 
temperature and sea level, rapidly retreating glaciers, thawing 
permafrost, lengthening growing seasons, lengthening ice-free 
seasons in the ocean and on lakes and rivers, earlier snowmelt, 
and alterations in river flows.”7  These changes are affecting 
everything from water resources and transportation 
infrastructure to human health.8
The urgency of the situation cries out for aggressive 
strategies.  There are two broad approaches necessary to address 
the existing and anticipated changes. First, as the IPCC 
recommends, industrialized nations need to dramatically reduce 
 
 
 3. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, KEY SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS 
SINCE THE IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org 
/docUploads/Key-Scientific-Developments-Since-IPCC-4th-Assessment.pdf. 
 4. IPCC Chairman Backs Deep Emissions Cuts, GREENWIRE, Aug. 26, 2009, 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/08/26/archive/6?terms=pachauri+. 
 5. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3. 
 6. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROJECT (USGRP), GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo & 
Thomas C. Peterson eds., 2009), available at http://www.globalchange.gov/ 
publications/reports/scientific-assessments/usimpa cts/full-report. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
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global emissions of greenhouse gases.  This reduction in 
emissions is commonly referred to as mitigation.  Second, all 
nations need to begin adapting to climate change impacts that 
are inevitable and already occurring from historic emissions.  
This response to existing and anticipated impacts is commonly 
referred to as adaptation. 
Pursuing mitigation and adaptation strategies will not be 
easy.  Climate change impacts and efforts to respond to those 
impacts will touch virtually every sector of society and implicate 
as wide a range of stakeholders as one can possibly imagine.  As a 
result, the complexity of crafting mitigation and adaptation 
responses is enormous.  The challenge faced by policy makers as a 
result of this complexity is compounded by the need to swiftly 
craft responses in the face of great uncertainty.  While there is 
broad consensus among scientists about the certainty of human-
induced climate change and many of its global effects, there is 
less certainty about the precise timing and scale of those effects 
as well as the specific nature of regional impacts and the 
effectiveness of proposed solutions.  As a result, decision makers 
are not likely to succeed in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions 
and adapting to climate change unless they design the responses 
in a manner that allows for flexibility as experts face rapidly 
changing scientific and technical information.  It is therefore in 
our best interest to draw upon all the resources and knowledge 
that exist within the many stakeholder groups involved in the 
climate change issue, and to use processes that will result in 
efficient and effective actions that are at once resilient and 
adaptable.  Collaborative decision making can help us achieve 
this objective. 
This article will discuss the application of collaborative 
decision making to climate change.  It will focus on opportunities 
for the federal government, in particular the Executive Branch,9 
to use collaborative decision making when crafting domestic 
responses to climate change.  While discussions about consul-
tation and coordination between Congress and the President or 
international collaborative processes9
 
 9. Asher Alkoby, Global Networks and International Environmental 
Lawmaking: a Discourse Approach, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 377 (2008) (discussing the 
application of deliberative democracy principles to the international climate 
 are beyond the scope of this 
3
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paper, there is historical support for the proposition that 
international climate change agreements made by the Executive 
Branch, without consulting Congress or obtaining diverse 
grassroots support, may be doomed to failure.10
Part II of this article will describe the general characteristics 
of collaborative decision-making and discuss why it has particular 
applicability to climate change.  Part III will demonstrate that 
collaborative decision making on environmental issues is already 
integrated within the federal government.  Part IV will provide a 
framework for considering the range of collaborative processes 
and Part V will apply that framework to specific examples of 
collaborative processes that have already been used by the federal 
government to address climate change.  Part VI will discuss some 
initial efforts among the federal agencies to foster interagency 
collaboration. 
 
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING CAPACITY 
FOR COLLABORATIVE DECISION-MAKIING AND 
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
WITHIN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Before discussing why it is important to build capacity within 
the federal government for collaborative decision making on 
climate change this section will describe the general 
characteristics of collaborative decision making. 
 
change arena).  For a brief discussion of an international collaborative process, 
see infra Part V.C. 
 10. David B. Hunter, International Climate Negotiations: Opportunities and 
Challenges for the Obama Administration, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 247, 
255 (2009) (referring to the Clinton Administration’s flawed strategy of setting 
strong carbon commitments internationally and then using those negotiations to 
gain the political support at home to win Congressional ratification); Thomas D. 
Peterson, The Evolution of State Climate Change Policy in the United States: 
Lessons Learned and New Directions, 14 WIDENER L.J. 81, 86-91 (2004) 
(discussing the Byrd-Hagel resolution and the Senate’s refusal to ratify an 
international climate change treaty after President Clinton signed the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the resulting trend by political leadership toward grassroots 
approaches and away from top-down imposition of climate change solutions). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
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 A.   Characteristics of Collaborative Decision Making 
1.   Defining Collaborative Decision Making 
There are many forms of collaborative processes. The 
Association for Conflict Resolution, in its report, Best Practices for 
Government Agencies: Guidelines for Using Collaborative 
Agreement-Seeking Processes,11 divides the universe of collabor-
ative processes into three broad categories: (1) those with the 
purpose of exchanging information and improving communication 
and understanding; (2) those where advice is provided to the 
government in the form of opinions or suggestions for action; and 
(3) those where agreement is sought and decisions are made with 
the government.  In the third category alone, the report identifies 
twenty-four different terms, including collaborative decision 
making, to describe collaborative processes.12  Many other terms 
exist for the remaining two categories and, in many instances, 
different meanings are ascribed to the same term.13  
Collaborative decision-making is sometimes referred to as stake-
holder involvement, public involvement, public participation, 
public-private partnership, deliberative democracy, constructive 
engagement, and collaborative problem solving.  The varied use of 
these terms demands clear definition when designing and 
describing processes.14
For purposes of this article, collaborative decision making 
will be considered broadly and is characterized by a range of 
processes, some agreement-seeking and some not, in which the 
government involves outside stakeholders in the government’s 
decision making.  In some cases, where the government has no 
greater authority than other stakeholders, collaborative decision 
making can involve an equal partnership among the 
 
 
 11. Ass’n for Conflict Resolution, Best Practices for Government Agencies: 
Guidelines for Using Collaborative Agreement-Seeking Processes, http://acrnet. 
org/acrlibrary/more.php?id=13_0_1_0_M (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). 
 12. Id. 
 13. DEBORAH DALTON & PHILIP J. HARTER, BETTER DECISIONS THROUGH 
CONSULTATION AND COLLABORATION 6, http://www.epa.gov/innovation/collabora 
tion/betterdecisions.pdf (describing how consultation and collaboration may be 
referred to, among other names, as “stakeholder involvement, public 
involvement, public participation, public-private partnership, deliberative 
democracy, constructive engagement, and collaborative problem solving”). 
 14. Id. 
5
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stakeholders, including the government; or the government can 
serve in a supporting role to facilitate efforts of outside 
stakeholders in their own decision making processes. 
2.   General Attributes of Collaborative Decision 
Making 
Collaborative decision making holds great promise for 
addressing difficult public policy issues.  There are a number of 
general attributes that are worth considering at the outset before 
discussing why decisions on climate change are uniquely qualified 
to benefit from collaborative approaches. 
Collaborative decision making can provide a forum for broad 
participation by multiple stakeholders, facilitate cooperative 
learning among the participants, and result in selection of the 
best policy choices.15  It ensures an opening for group creativity 
and innovation that is often lacking in traditional regulatory 
processes.  Collaborative decision making can be particularly 
powerful in the context of complex public policy issues, such as 
climate change, because it can create a dialogue based on hope16 
that can transcend the despair that leads to inaction.17  By 
promoting ownership and empowerment among the stakeholders, 
collaborative decision-making can increase the likelihood of 
prompt action while reducing the likelihood of litigation.18
 
 15. Annecoos Wiersema, Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law 
and Goals in the Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 
1252-53 (2008) (discussing collaborative decision making in the ecosystem 
management context). 
  While 
 16. R. McGreggor Cawley, Still Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: Some 
Thoughts on Hope, Progress, and Politics, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 
13 (2003). 
 17. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN 
PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE: ADDRESSING A MULTI-FACETED PHENOMENON AND SET OF CHALLENGES 
148-150 (2009), http://www.apa.org/releases/climate-change.pdf (arguing that 
despair and other emotions, such as fear, can affect policy support for climate 
change action). See also Edna Sussman, Climate Change Framing and Social 
Marketing: The Influences that Persuade, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2009) 
(discussing the importance of understanding human behavior and the benefits of 
social marketing to garner the necessary public sentiment for taking action on 
climate change). 
 18. NAT’L POLICY CONSENSUS CTR, INTEGRATING COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES: 
PUBLIC DELIBERATION WITH STAKEHOLDER PROCESSES 1 (2007), http://www.policy 
consensus.org/publications/reports/integrating_activities.pdf; but see Michael 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
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collaborative decision-making may appear to be quite resource 
intensive because it often requires investment of more time up-
front, it can ultimately produce results faster and with fewer 
resources than traditional processes.19  As a result of up-front 
efforts that engender buy-in from multiple stakeholders, decisions 
made through collaborative processes are more lasting and more 
likely to be implemented than decisions made via traditional 
processes.20
Collaborative decision-making does not mean that the 
government cedes its authority to make decisions.  It retains 
ultimate authority to impose its own solutions using traditional 
processes.  In fact, collaborative decisions may actually thrive 
when the government’s authorities are clear and purposeful.
 
21  
Likewise, stakeholders retain their right to any alternatives to 
the collaborative process that are otherwise available to them.22
Collaborative decision-making is not a panacea alternative to 
traditional environmental regulation and will not always be the 
appropriate means of making environmental decisions.
 
23
 
McCloskey, Problems with Using Collaboration to Shape Environmental Public 
Policy, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 423 (2000) (arguing that collaborative decision making 
can take more time than traditional processes and might not reduce the 
likelihood of litigation). 
  It does 
not guarantee that cooperation among stakeholders will come 
easily nor does its adoption mean that resolution of complex 
 19. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1997) (referring to EPA findings regarding benefits of 
negotiated rulemaking). 
 20. NAT’L POLICY CONSENSUS CTR., supra note 18, at 1. 
 21. Kirk Emerson & Peter Murchie, Collaborative Governance and Climate 
Change: Opportunities for Public Administration, in THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, AND PUBLIC SERVICE AROUND THE WORLD: 
THE MINNOWBROOK PERSPECTIVE 141-61 (Rosemary O’Leary, Soonhee Kim & 
David Van Slyke eds., forthcoming 2009). 
 22. In any agreement-seeking process, both government and non-
governmental stakeholders will be able to most effectively participate if they 
have a clear understanding of their best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA). See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: 
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 
1991) (1983). Likewise, in collaborative processes that do not seek agreement, it 
is important for stakeholders to understand their alternatives to participation. 
 23. Craig Anthony Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic: 
Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. REV. 1, 45 (2004) (noting the 
benefits of “collaborative problem-solving” while recognizing that there are 
limits to its use as an alternative to environmental law). 
7
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issues will be achieved.  However, it is an important option to be 
considered, particularly for intractable problems like climate 
change, where government needs to take advantage of a wide 
range of opportunities for making progress.  The following section 
discusses why collaborative decision making is particularly well 
suited for addressing climate change. 
 B.   Collaborative Decision Making as a Strategy to 
Address Climate Change 
The federal government is at a turning point on how it will 
reckon with climate change.  The Obama Administration has 
taken bold steps to ensure that the issue remains front and center 
on the national agenda and that progress is made on a response.  
In the first nine months after President Obama’s inauguration, 
the Administration, among other things, set in motion a process 
for establishing vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards and 
stringent fuel economy standards,24 issued a proposed and final 
Greenhouse Gas Reporting rule,25 reversed the prior 
Administration’s denial26 of California’s request for a waiver 
under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases from motor 
vehicles,27 responded to the Supreme Court decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA28
 
 24. Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 49,454 (Sept. 28, 2009); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to 
Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,904 (May 26, 2009) 
(proposing standards for renewable fuels). See also U.S. Envtl. Protection 
Agency, Final Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/endangerment/downloads/FinalFindings.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 
2009). 
 by proposing an endangerment finding 
 25. Proposed Rule on Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 16,448 (Apr. 10, 2009). See also U. S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Final 
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule, http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/emissions/ghgrulemaking.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). 
 26. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
 27. Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009). 
 28. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
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under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act,29 and initiated a 
rulemaking process to regulate greenhouse gases from stationary 
sources.30 The President has also championed cap-and-trade 
legislation and is prepared to use the Clean Air Act as a backstop 
if Congress does not take action.31
Despite these efforts, after eight years of relative inaction on 
climate change by the Bush Administration, there is a major task 
at hand to build capacity on climate change science, law and 
policy, education, and technology.  There is also a great need to 
build capacity on collaborative decision-making and public 
involvement on climate change.  This can be accomplished, in 
part, by increasing the numbers of climate change stakeholder 
representatives and neutrals who are skilled in the process of 
collaborative decision-making. 
 
While building process capacity may not always flow from the 
need to build substantive capacity on any particular environ-
mental issue, many characteristics of the climate change problem 
suggest a need for process-oriented capacity-building now.32
 
 29. Proposed Endangerment and Cause and Contribute Findings for 
Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (Apr. 24, 2009). 
  
Among the factors that call for collaborative decision making are: 
(1) the need for adaptive management in the face of uncertainty; 
(2) the benefits of drawing upon the significant expertise gained 
by many state and local governments during the years of federal 
government inaction; (3) the expectation that a climate bill will 
necessitate intensive rulemaking; (4) the federal government’s 
unique role in responding to natural disasters; (5) the 
international trans-boundary nature of impacts and solutions; 
and (6) the anticipated stress on infrastructure and resources due 
to climate change.  A number of these factors also reflect the 
importance of the federal government as an agent for 
collaborative decision making.  Each of these six factors are 
 30. EPA PROPOSED RULE, PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND 
TITLE V GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE (2009), http://www.epa.gov/NSR/ 
documents/GHGTailoringProposal.pdf. 
 31. See Darren Samuelsohn, Obama Prefers Congress to EPA in Tackling 
Climate--Browner, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/cwire/2009/02/23/23climatewire-obama-prefers-congress-to-epa-when-it-
comes-t-9800.html. 
 32. Some of these factors apply to collaboration even where the federal 
government is not a party but many have specific import for the federal 
government as a vehicle for, or participant in, a collaborative effort. 
9
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discussed below.  While they are by no means exclusive, these 
factors represent some of the most compelling reasons for why 
collaborative decision making should be embraced as a process 
solution to climate change. 
1.   Decision Making in the Face of Uncertainty:  
 The Need for Adaptive Management 
Climate change planning is fraught with uncertainty.  First, 
on the global scale, despite an already existing robust body of 
data on climate change impacts, there is uncertainty about the 
precise timing and extent of those impacts. Additionally, 
scientists are constantly refining models and other predictive 
tools.  The trend in new projections has been toward worsening 
impacts;33
Given these three areas of uncertainty, decisions on climate 
change will have to be fashioned with the recognition that there 
may be a large range of probabilistic outcomes.
 and if this trend continues, policy makers may find the 
need to revise their mitigation planning in a more aggressive 
manner.  Second, while scientists have made significant advances 
in developing more reliable downscale models for regional and 
local impact projections, great uncertainty still remains.  As a 
result, efforts to adapt to climate change will need to be revisited 
and updated frequently.  Third, technological and other solutions 
will have to be selected and implemented without complete 
certainty about their effectiveness because we are in a race 
against time.  Once implemented, these solutions might, in some 
cases, fail to help us mitigate or adapt and, in other cases, be 
rejected because they result in new environmental problems. 
34  In addition, 
political will to take action appears to be on the rise35 and can be 
expected to rise further as the voting public begins to experience, 
and gain awareness of actual climate change impacts.36
 
 33. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3. 
  As a 
result, more aggressive regulatory measures, which are 
 34. Emerson & Murchie, supra note 21, at 141-61. 
 35. See Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Oct. 22, 2009, http://people-
press.org/report/556/global-warming (describing how global warming awareness 
has dropped since the 2008 presidential campaign). 
 36. Educating and engaging the public will be a key element in achieving 
support for critical government action.  See generally Sussman, supra note 17. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
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unthinkable today, may become possible.  Given the scientific, 
technological, and political uncertainty, decisions on climate 
change mitigation and adaptation require a significant level of 
flexibility.  A constant stream of new information will create the 
need to be nimble as policy makers find cause to update decisions.  
As such, decisions must be made in an experimental context with 
the recognition that some actions will fail37
Collaborative decision-making can “foster innovative, 
prompt, and efficient responses to changing conditions” and 
therefore provide the flexibility needed to adapt.
 and opportunities for 
more effective options will arise. 
38
The basic premise of adaptive management is that, as 
stakeholders obtain more information about a problem, they can 
adapt the way they manage the problem.  This feedback loop 
allows the stakeholders to make decisions in the face of 
uncertainty with the recognition that they will modify decisions 
as they learn more.
  The term 
“adapt” in this context is distinguishable from the more typical 
usage of climate change adaptation, for example, by building a 
bigger sea wall.  Instead, it refers to adapting our “management” 
of the problem, for example, by revisiting over time how high the 
sea wall needs to be.  This concept applies to decisions made 
about both mitigation and adaptation and is often referred to as 
“adaptive management.”  Collaborative decision-making can be 
initiated with the goal of designing an adaptive management 
strategy.  It can also create the necessary trust and shared 
experience among stakeholders to successfully carry out the 
ongoing decisions necessary for adaptive management. 
39  Adaptive management is used in the 
resource management world as a way to deal with problems in 
large complex systems.  As such, the approach would appear to 
have significant import for the problem of climate change.40
 
 37. Emerson & Murchie, supra note 21, at 141-61 (noting that “we will need 
to view governance more as an experiment, and less as a predictable machine”). 
  In 
 38. Nancy P. Spyke, Heeding the Call: Making Sustainability a Matter of 
Pennsylvania Law, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 729, 760 (2005). 
 39. See Richard Roos-Collins, A Perpetual Experiment to Restore and Manage 
Silicon Valley's Guadalupe River, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 291 (2005) 
(describing an adaptive management process). 
 40. See Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Adaptive Management as an 
Operational Approach for Resource Management Agencies, 3 CONSERVATION 
ECOLOGY 2, 8 (1999), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss2/ 
11
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fact, the U.S. Climate Change Science Program recognizes 
adaptive management as a strategy for dealing with the 
uncertainty of climate change: “[t]his method [adaptive 
management] supports managers in taking action today using the 
best available information while also providing the possibility of 
ongoing future refinements through an iterative learning 
process.”41
The principle of adaptive management can be applied to 
aspects of climate change other than resource management.  For 
example, it could prove useful when considering controversial 
technological fixes, such as carbon capture and sequestration, for 
mitigation purposes.  While the precautionary principle
 
42 would 
favor acquiring sufficient knowledge before introducing a new 
technology into an ecosystem, adaptive management would 
recognize both the pressing need to take action and the potential 
for harm to an ecosystem when introducing the new technology.43  
The potential for harm arises because decision makers and 
stakeholders cannot wait for all questions to be answered before 
they take action.44
 
art8/; Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global 
Climate Change: an Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. 
L. REV. 833 (2009). 
  Thus, they must weigh the amount of 
 41. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMM. ON GlOBAL 
CHANGE RESEARCH, PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-
SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 3 (2008), http://downloads.climatescien 
ce.gov/sap/sap4-4/sap4-4-final-report-all.pdf. 
 42. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Full Text of the 
Convention, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/item 
s/1349.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). In discussing the issue of climate change,   
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at 
the lowest possible cost.  
Id. art. 3. See also Edna Sussman & David Major, Fostering Progress Through 
Law and Regulation, N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (noting that the 
precautionary principle suggests that reasonable, prudent, and feasible 
measures should not be deferred pending scientific unanimity). 
 43. Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Maieusis Through a Gated Membrane: 
"Getting the Science Right" in Public Decision-Making, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 373, 
434 (2007). 
 44. Sussman & Major, supra note 42. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
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uncertainty they are willing to tolerate against the need for 
prompt action and determine how to manage that uncertainty 
and risk once an action has gone forward. 
Successful implementation of adaptive management 
therefore requires mutual trust given the associated risk and 
uncertainty of experimentation.45
2.   Local, State, and Regional Action 
  Collaborative processes can 
help to build and maintain the trust among stakeholders needed 
for ultimate success given that there may be failures along the 
way.  Moreover, collaborative processes can also provide a 
communication and process framework for bringing the same 
stakeholders back to the table as new information arises.  Given 
the inherent uncertainty in fashioning climate change responses, 
collaborative decision making is more likely to result in selection 
of decisions that are better in the first instance, require fewer 
revisions, and are more adaptable when revisions are necessary. 
Another factor that makes climate change planning well 
suited for collaborative decision-making is the important role that 
many states and local governments have already played in 
fashioning solutions.  In the vacuum of eight years of federal 
inaction, states have taken the lead on climate change.  As of 
April 2009, thirty-five states had completed or were poised to 
complete climate action plans, twenty states had adopted 
greenhouse gas reduction targets, and seventeen states had 
developed or were developing mandatory greenhouse gas 
reporting rules.46 In addition, thirty-three states were 
participants or observers in three major regional cap-and-trade 
initiatives: (1) the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI); (2) 
the Western Climate Initiative (WCI); and (3) the Midwest 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord.47
 
 45. Beth C. Bryant, Adapting to Uncertainty: Law, Science, and Management 
in the Steller Sea Lion Controversy, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 203 (2009). 
  Strong motivation to take 
 46. American Clean Energy And Security Act of 2009: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Energy & Com. on H.R.2454, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (testimony of Bill 
Becker, Executive Dir. of Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies), [hereinafter 
Testimony] available at http://www.4cleanair.org/Documents/WaxmanMarkey 
BillNACAATestimonyFINAL042209.pdf. 
 47. For a current map of the states involved in these initiatives, see Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change, Regional Initiatives, http://www.pewclimate. 
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action on climate change also was experienced at the local level.  
More than 900 mayors signed the U.S. Conference of Mayors 
Climate Protection Agreement and pledged to meet or beat Kyoto 
Protocol targets in their communities.48
As discussed earlier,
 
49 the Obama Administration has clearly 
signaled its intention to take aggressive steps on climate change 
and Congress is closer to a climate bill than it has ever been in 
the past.  However, the traditional model where the federal 
government makes decisions and the states implement those 
decisions is not likely to be successful.  States have already 
invested a great deal of time and resources into fashioning their 
own individual responses to climate change50 and will not want to 
be cast aside.  Moreover, the federal government can benefit from 
lessons learned at the state and local level.  The most significant 
import of state innovation on climate change may not be the 
emissions reductions they have achieved, but rather their ability 
to inform decisions on a national program.51  As “laboratories of 
innovation,” future state strategies can continue to inform federal 
policy and be a basis for revising federal programs.52  In addition, 
states exercise primary authority in many areas, such as; land 
use, building codes, municipal waste, water supply, and 
transportation planning.53
 
org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/regional_initiatives.cfm (last visited Nov. 
26, 2009). 
  Therefore, a collaborative approach to 
comprehensive greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation will 
 48. Testimony, supra note 46, at 3. 
 49. See supra Part II.B. 
 50. Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or 
Layered Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save 
our Public Lands?, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 449, 456-61 (2008) 
(arguing that collaboration management of public lands is more likely to avoid 
friction with state government than the traditional “dominant federal” model, 
with its centralized, coercive control over state action). 
 51. Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: 
A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 56-57 (2005). 
 52. NAT’L ASS’N OF CLEAN AIR AGENCIES, CONFERENCE MATERIALS FOR 
DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES IN FEDERAL GLOBAL WARMING 
LEGISLATION 10 (2008), http://www.4cleanair.org/documents/GWConferenceMat 
erials.pdf. 
 53. Robert B. McKinstry Jr., et al., The New Climate World: Achieving 
Economic Efficiency in a Federal System for Greenhouse Gas Control Through 
State Planning Combined with Federal Programs, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 767, 771 (2009). 
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serve to maximize the relative opportunities of the states and 
federal government to address climate change. 
As the federal government goes forward, it can also benefit 
from lessons learned by the states on the process by which they 
have generated the state climate change action plans.  The state 
plans were developed using “bottom-up stakeholder and 
technical-work-group-driven processes.”54 Thus, the state 
experience in developing a response to climate change has been 
one rooted in collaborative decision making.  This experience will 
likely inform state expectations for how the federal government 
will interact with state, local, and other stakeholders.55
3.   Legislation 
 
It is likely that Congress will pass some form of climate 
change legislation in the near future.  Due to the pressing need to 
take aggressive action quickly, the legislation will probably 
require a considerable amount of federal rulemaking within a 
short period of time.  It is not likely that the legislation will 
include many statutory provisions specifically compelling 
collaborative decision-making.56
 
 54. Id. at 777. Many of these process-related innovations were developed by 
the Center for Climate Strategies. See Center for Climate Strategies, U.S. 
Climate Policy Action, http://www.climatestrategies.us/ (last visited Nov. 26, 
2009). 
  While there has been a great 
 55. This expectation is reflected in a discussion paper of the National 
Association of Clean Air Agencies. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CLEAN AIR AGENCIES, 
supra note 52, at 19 (noting “[a]s part of implementing a national GHG program 
. . . state and local experts could form an advisory body that provides real-time 
guidance to the implementing federal agency (likely EPA); such guidance would 
be used to improve program implementation”). 
 56. One example of support for collaborative processes is in the Clean Energy 
Jobs and American Power Act, proposed by Senators Boxer and Kerry. See S. 
Doc. No. 111-1733 (2009). The relevant language is found not in a rulemaking 
provision, but in a section related to whether developing countries can 
participate in an offset program for reduced deforestation. To be eligible, 
developing countries must have a “national policy for consultations with, and 
full participation of, all stakeholders, especially indigenous and forest-
dependent communities, in its design, planning, and implementation of 
activities, whether at the national or local level, to reduce deforestation in the 
country.” S. Doc. No. 111-1733, § 744(e)(2)(c)(v) (2009). It is also likely that there 
will be a federal coordinating body, like a National Climate Service, in the 
climate legislation that emerges from Congress. See infra Part VI. For an 
example of legislation involving collaborative decision-making in another 
environmental context, see Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Lessons in 
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deal of debate and discussion over the last several years about the 
design of a cap-and-trade program and other aspects of a climate 
change bill, little attention has been paid to the institutional or 
organizational approach to implementing such legislation.57
The American Clean Energy and Security Act,
  
Collaborative decision-making could help to achieve successful 
implementation of rulemaking under a climate bill. 
58 passed by 
the House of Representatives, would require federal agencies to 
promulgate many regulations in a short period of time.  Under 
Title III, “Reducing Global Warming Pollution,” alone, as much as 
sixty-five regulations would have to be promulgated and, in most 
cases, the regulations will have to be completed within the first 
two years of enactment.59  This is a huge task particularly 
because of the complexity of the issues.  Traditional rulemaking 
can result in an adversarial game in which information becomes a 
weapon rather than a tool for decision-making and is used to 
thwart and delay agency action.60  In order to quickly develop 
rules that are not only likely to be effective but also survive 
litigation, the federal government can benefit from applying the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act61
 
Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87 NEB. L. REV. 
893, 912-13 (2009) (discussing special legislation that requires collaborative 
decision making for certain restoration activities in the Everglades and in the 
Grand Canyon). 
 or similar stakeholder processes.  
There are many stakeholders, including states and local 
government that have a great deal of experience to lend to 
climate change rulemaking.  The federal government can best 
 57. Barry G. Rabe, Commentary, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 787 (2008). 
 58. American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 
331 (2009) (as passed by the House of Representatives, June 26, 2009). 
 59. See ROGER R. MARTELLA, AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 
2009: REGULATORY RULE MAKING PROVISIONS (2009), http://www.sidley.com/ 
files/Event/c878736b-0f8e4a369b45d6e7b2b991f3/Presentatiocn/EventAttachme 
nt/c4393717-179c-46d2-ba38-104dcecfff13/ACESA%20table.pdf (noting in Sidley 
and Austin’s analysis that some of the sixty-five rulemaking actions could be 
potentially grouped together). 
 60. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for 
the New Congress and Administration: Panel II—Setting priorities: Framing 
Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 80-81 
(2008) (arguing that an “information roadblock” is pervasive in environmental 
regulation). 
 61. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4976 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1990)). 
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leverage the expertise of these stakeholders through collaborative 
processes. 
4. Natural Disasters and the Federal Government’s 
Unique Role 
Another factor that suggests the importance of using 
collaborative decision making to address climate change is the 
impact from anticipated increases in extreme weather events and 
natural weather related disasters.  As the effects of climate 
change become more widespread, the federal government will 
increasingly be called upon to take action to respond to those 
effects.  Catastrophic weather events, like Hurricane Katrina, 
will become more prevalent.62
5. International Engagement 
  State government officials will not 
always have the resources to address the needs of their citizens.  
In addition to providing resources such as disaster relief funds 
and personnel, the federal government can act as a convener or 
facilitator of collaborative processes to assist with the many 
decisions that will have to be made among multiple stakeholders 
regarding repair, rebuilding, resiliency, and relocation of 
displaced people. 
The global nature of climate change suggests the importance 
of collaborative decision making on the international level.  The 
climate change crisis cannot be properly addressed without 
international engagement from the United States.  While some 
state and regional organizations have achieved limited success 
with international outreach,63
 
 62. See U.S. Global Change Research Program, Hurricanes: A Compendium 
of Hurricane Information, Hurricanes & Climate Change, http://www.usgcrp.gov 
/usgcrp/links/hurricanes.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (predicting that 
hurricanes will become more intense because of warming sea surface 
temperatures). 
 there is little dispute that the 
global crisis of climate change cannot be properly addressed 
without participation of the federal government.  Indeed, many 
significant emitters among the developing nations will not agree 
 63. See Western Climate Initiative, WCI Partners and Observers Map, 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/wci-partners-and-observers-map (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2009) (the Western Climate Initiative includes four Canadian 
provinces). 
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to an international framework unless the U.S. government has 
engaged in the process.  International efforts by the United 
States on a broad scale, as in a post-Kyoto agreement,64 as well 
as on a smaller bilateral65 or project-specific multilateral scale,66 
can benefit from collaborative approaches.67
6.  Resources and Infrastructure 
 
Climate change will stress existing resources and 
infrastructure and require new and creative uses of existing 
resources to meet the basic needs of the American people.  
Collaborative decision making can be an effective tool to help 
address these challenges.  For example, water resource impacts 
from climate change may require all levels of government to 
reassess current institutional structures involved in our Nation’s 
water supply and seek new collaborative arrangements.68
 
 64. See Cop15, Copenhagen, U.N. Climate Change Conference, 
http://en.cop15.dk/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (stating the Conference of the 
Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change will meet in 
Copenhagen December 7-18, 2009 to consider a post-Kyoto agreement). 
  The 
American West and other parts of the country are projected to 
experience severe drought, early springtime water runoff, and 
more competition for limited resources.  Existing compacts 
designed to ensure adequate water supply to the Western states 
may be in jeopardy as water resources become scarcer and 
 65. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on 
Climate Change, Energy and the Environment between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, 
July 28, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
126802.pdf (signed by U.S. State Department, agreement between China and 
the U.S.). 
 66. See infra Part V.C.3 (regarding the U.S. engagement with other countries 
in the Methane to Markets program). 
 67. A discussion of collaborative opportunities at the December 2009 15th 
Conference of the Parties (COP-15) meeting in Copenhagen is beyond the scope 
of this article. See generally Cop15, supra note 64; Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, International, http://www.pewclimate.org/international (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 68. Bret C. Birdsong, Collaboration and the Colorado River: Seances, 
Cienegas, and Slop: Can Collaboration Save the Delta?, 8 NEV. L.J. 853, 867-68 
(2008) (discussing collaborative efforts to allocate waters in the Colorado River 
basin). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
SIEGEL  
2009-10] COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 275 
competition grows between states.69
The federal government may need to serve in a similar 
capacity, using collaborative decision making, with respect to 
changes in our energy supply and transmission.  The U.S. 
Department of Energy has already launched a collaborative 
project with the Western Governors Association to designate 
zones for renewable energy projects and plan for power 
transmission from those zones to western load centers.
  Stronger federal 
government involvement may be necessary to address water 
resource concerns just as it was to address trans-boundary air 
pollution.  The federal government may be able to serve as 
convener or facilitator in seeking agreement between the states 
affected by shrinking water supplies. 
70  The 
federal government may also need to play a role in addressing 
potential disruption to existing energy supply distribution 
systems in the United States due to weather related impacts from 
climate change.71
III.   SUPPORT FOR COLLABORATIVE DECISION 
MAKING WITHIN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
  There will likely be increasing opportunities 
for the federal government to use collaborative decision making 
in other resource and infrastructure contexts such as transpor-
tation, grazing rights, pipeline access, and natural resource 
management, among others. 
Collaborative decision-making thrives in an atmosphere of 
transparency and open government.  This section first highlights 
the Obama Administration’s shift to a more transparent and 
collaborative approach to governing; and then provide back-
 
 69. Robert W. Adler, Symposium Essay: Revisiting the Colorado River 
Compact: Time for a Change?, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19 (2008) 
(arguing that climate change is a reason to reconsider the Colorado River 
Compact). 
 70. Lynne Gillette et al., Using Collaboration to Address Renewable Energy 
Siting Challenges, 56 FED. LAWYER 54 (2009). 
 71. See U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON 
ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE IN THE U.S., http://www.climatescience.gov/ 
Library/sap/sap4-5/final-report/sap4-5-final-chap3.pdf (discussing how the 
effects from weather disruptions and warming temperatures on the U.S. energy 
infrastructure could be large in some localities, including the Gulf Coast, the 
Gulf of Mexico, and Alaska). 
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ground on the use of collaborative decision making in the 
environmental context. 
A. The Obama Administration:  
Placing a New Emphasis on Transparency, Open 
Government, and Collaboration 
Collaborative decision-making is part of a broader movement 
to rethink the way government conducts its business72 in order to 
afford greater public involvement in government decisions.  New 
approaches have been implemented to give the public greater 
opportunity to become involved in the decisions made by their 
government.  President Obama has championed a philosophy of 
open government and on his first day in office, he issued the 
Transparency and Open Government Memorandum 
(Memorandum) for the heads of federal executive departments 
and agencies.73  The Memorandum ushered in a new era in which 
the federal government is charged with being transparent, 
participatory, and collaborative;74 a marked contrast to the prior 
Administration.75
 
 72. Emerson & Murchie, supra note 21, at 141-61 (discussing several streams 
of theory and practice of public decision making and management that have led 
to the emergence of collaborative governance). 
  This shift in the federal government’s 
 73. Memorandum from the President of the U.S. to the Heads of Executive 
Dep’ts and Agencies on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685 
(Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Transparency Memorandum], available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment/. The 
President also issued, on his first day in office, the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) Memorandum. See Memorandum on the FOIA from the President of the 
U.S. to the Heads of Executive Dep’ts  and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,683 (Jan. 21, 
2009), [hereinafter FOIA Memorandum], available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the_press_office/FreedomofInformationAct/. The FOIA Memorandum 
requires the federal government to return to the Clinton-era presumption in 
favor of disclosure; see Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www 
.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm. The memorandum takes 
“affirmative steps to make information public” and does not “wait for specific 
requests from the public.” FOIA Memorandum, supra. This approach was 
affirmed in a Memorandum issued by Attorney General Eric Holder on March 
19, 2009. See Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-march 2009.pdf. 
 74. Transparency Memorandum, supra note 73. 
 75. Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of Terror: 
The Bush Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 COMM. L. & 
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approach to governing is not only intended to promote 
accountability and engage citizens in the work of their 
government, but it is expected to foster increased effectiveness 
and improved decision-making.76  The Memorandum encourages 
collaborative decision making, and other public involvement 
approaches, by instructing federal agencies to use “innovative 
tools, methods, and systems to cooperate among themselves, 
across all levels of government, and with organizations, 
businesses, and individuals in the private sector.”77  Another sign 
of the President’s commitment to stakeholder involvement is the 
new Office of Public Engagement launched by President Obama 
on May 11, 2009 “to engage as many Americans as possible in the 
difficult work of changing this country.”78
 
POL'Y 479 (2006) (concluding that the September 11, 2001 attacks provided a 
pretext for the Bush Administration’s preference for secrecy in carrying out the 
business of government); Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power, 
Information, and the Executive Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
247, 256-58 (2008) (discussing the lack of transparency in the Bush 
Administration and noting how it contrasted with the Clinton Administration’s 
approach to the Freedom of Information Act). 
  This philosophy of 
open government has also found its way into the environmental 
arena.  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator 
Lisa Jackson stated the following in her initial Memo to EPA 
Employees: “I pledge that we will carry out the work of the 
 76. See Kirtley, supra note 75; Setty, supra note 75. In the Transparency and 
Open Government Memorandum, the President directed the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), Chief Technology Officer, and General 
Services Administration, to make recommendations within 120 days regarding 
issuance of an Open Government Directive. The OMB thereupon launched the 
Open Government Initiative on May 21, 2009, to involve the public in making 
the recommendations. See The White House, Open Government Initiative, 
Transparency and Open Government, http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/ (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2009). Following a three-phase electronic public process, draft 
recommendations are currently being reviewed by government officials for 
implementation of the Memorandum. See Executive Office of the President 
Office of the U.S., http://www.mixedink.com/OpenGov/ (last visited Nov. 26, 
2009). 
 77. Transparency Memorandum, supra note 73. 
 78. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sect’y, President 
Obama Launches Office of Public Engagement, A New Name, Mission for White 
House Liaison Office (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the_press_office/President-Obama-Launches-Office-of-Public-Engagement/ (this 
office replaced the Office of Public Liaison and will have a new focus on 
obtaining ideas and information from the American people through public 
events and on-line interaction). 
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Agency in public view so that the door is open to all interested 
parties and that there is no doubt why we are acting and how we 
arrived at our decisions.”79
Transparency and open government has been a key tool in 
building consensus on state climate action plans.
 
80  It is becoming 
an important element of federal collaborative decision making on 
climate change as well.  Transparency figures into a range of 
specific processes that are being initiated by the federal 
government to ensure greater stakeholder involvement.81
 B.   Collaborative Processes in the Federal 
Government on Environmental Issues: A 
Foundation for Collaborative Decision Making on 
Climate Change 
 
Although the Obama Administration has established a new 
emphasis on transparency and open government, collaborative 
decision-making is not new to the federal government and there 
is existing support for it, in particular, in the environmental 
arena.82
One of the most significant events to stimulate environ-
mental collaborative decision-making in the federal government 
was Congress’ enactment of the Environmental Policy and 
Conflict Resolution Act of 1998.  This Act established the U.S. 
Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution (IECR).
  The federal government’s experience with 
environmental collaborative decision making provides an 
excellent foundation for its use in the context of climate change. 
83
 
 79. Memorandum from EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson to EPA (Jan. 23, 
2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/administrator/memotoemployees.html. 
  IECR’s 
mission includes improving environmental decision-making in the 
federal government by increasing the capacity of agencies and 
other affected stakeholders to engage in environmental conflict 
 80. Peterson, supra note 10, at 86-91 (2004). 
 81. See infra Parts IV-V (for discussion about a continuum of collaborative 
processes options and specific examples of those process options). 
 82. See generally Joseph A. Siegel, Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Environmental Enforcement Cases: A Call for Enhanced Assessment and Greater 
Use, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 189-96 (2007) (discussing federal statutory, 
policy and institutional support for environmental conflict resolution). 
 83. Environmental Policy and Conflict Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-156, § 2, 112 Stat. 9 (1998) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5609 
(2000)). 
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resolution.84  Environmental conflict resolution is defined by 
IECR to include collaborative problem solving.85  IECR meets 
with senior agency staff quarterly to provide guidance and 
facilitate information exchange on collaboration and other forms 
of environmental conflict resolution within the federal 
government.86
Several federal agencies have their own institutional 
structures to support collaborative decision making on 
environmental issues.  For example, EPA established the Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution Center in 1999,
 
87 the Department of 
Interior established the Collaborative Action and Dispute 
Resolution Center in 2001,88 and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission established a similar service in 1999.89
In addition to institutional structures such as IECR and 
agency environmental conflict resolution centers, there have been 
important policy developments to support collaborative decision 
making in the federal government.  Building on IECR’s mission, a 
joint Memorandum issued by the Office of Management and 
Budget and the Council on Environmental Quality in 2005 
instructed federal agencies to employ collaborative problem 
solving and, in recognition of the potential for improved outcomes 
and reduced costs, asked agency leadership to “recognize and 
support needed upfront investments in collaborative processes.”
 
90
 
 84. U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resolution, About Us, http://www.ecr.gov/ 
HowWeWork/AboutUs.aspx#overview (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
  
 85. U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resolution, Definition & Principles, 
http://www.ecr.gov/Basics/Principles.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 86. See U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resolution, Quarterly Interagency ECR 
Forums, http://www.ecr.gov/Resources/FederalECRPolicy/QuarterlyInteragency 
Forums.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (the quarterly meeting agendas and 
summaries can be found at this site). 
 87. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Conflict Prevention and Resolution 
Center, http://www.epa.gov/ adr/index.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (EPA 
engaged in environmental conflict resolution for many years prior to 
establishment of the Center). 
 88. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Collaborative Action and Dispute 
Resolution, http://www.doi.gov/cadr/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 89. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/adr.asp (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 90. Memorandum from Joshua Bolten, Director, Office of Management & 
Budget, and James L. Connaughton, Chairman, Council on Environmental. 
Quality, to Secretary Administrator, (Nov. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.ecr.gov/pdf/OMB_CEQ _Joint_Statement.pdf. See also Exec. Order 
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In reality, many federal agencies have policies to ensure that 
public involvement, consultation, and collaborative decision 
making is part of the way they do business with respect to 
environmental issues.91  The Forest Service views collaborative 
decision making in the context of natural resource management, 
wherein “groups with different interests come together to address 
management issues across a large geographic region such as a 
forest, watershed, or landscape.”92  The Department of Interior 
(DOI) has adopted the “4 Cs” representing conservation through 
cooperation, communication, and consultation.93 The DOI 
emphasizes “cooperation” to foster voluntary action, partnerships, 
and collaboration, “communication” to ensure accountability, 
transparency, and innovation through exchange of ideas, and 
“consultation” with those who possess knowledge and experience 
integral to the process.  The National Park Service (NPS) views 
public involvement along a “continuum that ranges from 
providing information and building awareness, to partnering in 
decision making.”94
The EPA also views public involvement along a continuum 
and has developed a template for considering stakeholder 
engagement, consultation, and collaboration.  In May 2003, EPA 
issued its Public Involvement Policy,
 
95
 
No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989 (Aug. 26, 2004) (fostering “cooperative 
conservation” in the federal government); Memorandum from James L. 
Connaughton, Chairman, Council on Environmental. Quality, to Secretary 
Donald H. Rumsfeld et al., Implementing Executive Order 13,352 through a 
Competency Based Approach to Collaboration and Partnering (Nov. 28, 2005) 
(designed to develop competency in collaboration and partnering skills). 
 which articulates the view 
 91. See Cooperative Conservation, Public Engagement Information 
Resources, http://cooperativeconservation.gov/get-involved/linkspublicengageme 
nt.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (listing resources and links to federal agency 
and department web-based information on collaboration). 
 92. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV. NAT’L P’SHIP, OFFICE & NAT’L FOREST 
FOUND. PARTNERSHIP GUIDE: THE POWER OF PEOPLE WORKING TOGETHER (2005), 
http://www.partnershipresourcecenter.org/resources/partnership-guide/Partner 
ship-Guide.pdf. 
 93. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, COOPERATIVE CONSERVATION: SUCCESS THROUGH 
PARTNERSHIPS 3, http://www.doi.gov/news/CoopConserv_PRINT.pdf. 
 94. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, DIRECTOR’S ORDER #75A: 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 5-6 (2007), http://www.nps.gov/ 
olicy/Orders/75A.pdf. 
 95. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON. & 
INNOVATION, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT POLICY OF THE U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
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that effective public involvement can help the EPA to achieve its 
mission of protecting human health and the environment while 
promoting democracy, civic engagement, and the public trust in 
government.96  Like the Association for Conflict Resolution,97 
EPA identifies three broad categories of public involvement that 
go beyond the simple one-way information and outreach 
mechanisms used for many government decisions.  These broad 
categories include exchanging information with the public, 
empowering stakeholders to provide recommendations to EPA, 
and reaching mutually acceptable decisions with selected 
stakeholder representatives.98
IV.  A FIVE-POINT TEMPLATE FOR CONSIDERING 
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE 
COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING AND 
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT WITH NON-FEDERAL 
STAKEHOLDERS 
  EPA refined the broad categories 
and developed a five-point template, discussed in the next section, 
for considering collaborative process options. 
EPA published a handbook to build on the three broad 
categories by providing detailed guidance to agency officials 
pursuing public involvement.99  The process options included in 
the handbook range from limited stakeholder outreach to 
empowering public participation in, and even control of, decision 
making.  The handbook provides a continuum of public 
consultation and collaboration with the following progression of 
public involvement categories: (1) outreach; (2) information 
exchange; (3) recommendations; and (4) agreements.100
 
publicinvolvement/pdf/policy2003. pdf [hereinafter EPA PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
POLICY].  
  In 
practice, EPA has added a fifth category, referred to as 
stakeholder action.  The EPA spectrum is modeled after a similar 
 96. Id. at 1. 
 97. See infra Part II.A.i. 
 98. EPA PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT POLICY, supra note 95, at 14-18. 
 99. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 6. 
 100. Id. 
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spectrum developed by the International Association for Public 
Participation (IAP2).101
As the spectrum progresses from outreach to stakeholder 
action, we are likely to see an increase in: (1) interaction among 
stakeholders; (2) opportunities for creative options; (3) commit-
ment to action; (4) collaborative behavior; and (5) sharing of the 
government’s authority to make decisions.  In each category, 
except “stakeholder action” where the government plays a 
supporting role, the government typically retains ultimate 
authority to make the decision.  However, each category involves 
a collaborative process that, at a minimum, informs the 
government decision. 
 
As noted earlier, it is very important that when the federal 
government involves the public in an important policy issue, such 
as climate change, it provides clarity about which category the 
action falls into.102  Failure to provide such clarity may lead to 
misunderstanding, mistrust, and expectations that cannot be 
met.103
There are many factors that inform the federal government’s 
decisions about which category along the spectrum it chooses for 
any particular action.  Such factors may include, among others, 
time constraints on finalizing a decision, political support within 
the agency for a particular process, court orders and judicial 
  For example, if the government’s goal is simply to 
exchange information with stakeholders but isn’t clear about the 
limits to the stakeholder process, some participants may expect 
that the exchange of information is a preliminary step that will 
lead to an opportunity to make recommendations and, possibly, 
even enter into agreement with the government. 
 
 101. See generally INT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. PARTICIPATION, IAP2 SPECTRUM OF 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (2007), http://www.iap2.org/associations /4748/files/IAP2 
%20Spectrum_vertical.pdf (this spectrum has been adopted by other 
organizations as well). See, e.g., THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE FUTURE OF 
COLLABORATION & CONSENSUS ON PUB. ISSUES IMPROVING CLARITY ON 
COLLABORATION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESSES 4, http://www.mediate.com 
/acrepp/docs/Spectrum.pdf. 
 102. See, e.g., JAMES L. CREIGHTON, DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND PUB. ACCOUNTABILITY, HOW TO DESIGN A PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION PROGRAM 6, http://cooperativeconservation.gov/get-involved/DOE 
HowtoGuide.pdf. 
 103. It can also have the effect of diminishing the likelihood of future use of 
collaborative processes. See Ass’n for Conflict Resolution, Best Practices, supra 
note 11. 
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requirements, regulatory and statutory requirements, stake-
holder expertise and depth of experience, and whether the action 
is novel or run of the mill.104  It is important that the government 
consider these and other factors via a preliminary internal needs 
assessment to, in essence, take the temperature of the agency 
regarding its commitment to a collaborative process, before 
discussing options with the public.  This internal assessment 
should be followed by an external situation assessment to gain a 
better understanding of the universe of potential stakeholders, 
their preferences, perspectives and needs.105
The next section presents examples of collaborative decision-
making and stakeholder engagement on climate change involving 
the federal government using EPA’s public engagement and 
collaboration spectrum.  It should be noted that, while there are 
five elements of the spectrum, the lines between these elements 
are often blurred in that a particular collaborative process may 
fall into more than one element.  Nonetheless, the spectrum 
serves as a useful vehicle for considering the kinds of 
collaborative processes that can be used to address climate 
change.  As reflected in the discussion below, there are already 
many examples of collaborative efforts on climate change 
involving the federal government, and there are, no doubt, many 
more examples not reflected in this article.  While there is no 
inventory of all such efforts, the examples below illustrate the 
range of collaborative process categories.  Given the expected 
uptick in climate change action within the federal government, 
these categories can serve as a framework for considering options 
for future collaborative decision-making. 
  The external 
situation assessment will help to ensure that the most 
appropriate process category along the spectrum is selected. 
 
 104. Id. at Appendix 1. The Association for Conflict Resolution provides a 
checklist to assist government officials in determining whether they should 
proceed with a collaborative process.  This same checklist can be used to explore 
which category along the spectrum of collaboration to select. 
 105. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13; see generally The Consensus Bldg. Inst. 
& The Land Use Law Ctr., Pace Univ. Law School, Conducting Conflict 
Assessments in the Land Use Context: A Manual (2000) (on file with author). 
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V.   EXAMPLES OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION 
MAKING ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
The examples in this section will begin with the information 
exchange category, rather than the less inclusive category of 
outreach.  Collaborative decision-making implies some process of 
working together towards a common end.  Although the 
government does work together with stakeholders in a minimal 
fashion when conducting outreach, the process is primarily 
intended as a mechanism to simply impart information to the 
public.106
 A.   Information Exchange 
  As such, this section will provide examples of the 
following processes along the spectrum: (1) information exchange; 
(2) recommendations; (3) agreements; and (4) stakeholder action.  
While these examples are not measured against any particular 
metric, they provide lessons-learned on collaborative processes 
and illustrate how the spectrum can be used to give consideration 
to options for future collaborative decision-making. 
During an information exchange, stakeholders share 
information, ideas, and concerns, and have the ability to define 
the problem, identify the issues, and discuss options.107  
Information exchange can be done with large or small groups of 
stakeholders, by invitation or through an open meeting.  While 
the goal of information exchange is not to obtain collective group 
advice, it is possible to get individual viewpoints on preliminary 
government proposals, discuss a range of perspectives, and 
improve understanding and communication among stake-
holders.108
 
 106. According to the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution, 
“[c]ollaboration as a general term describes how people and organizations work 
together, literally meaning ‘co-labor.’ There are many ways to collaborate: 
informally or formally, as partners or in teams, in advisory capacities or as joint 
decision-makers. Collaboration is at the core of ECR [environmental conflict 
resolution] processes.” U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resolution, FAQs, 
http://www.ecr.gov/Basics/FAQs.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
  Transparency is particularly important in an 
information exchange process so that stakeholders are willing to 
be candid rather than positional and the dialogue can be open 
 107. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 9. 
 108. Id. 
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and more productive.109
1.   The Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule 
  The following examples of information 
exchange include two climate change rulemaking processes and a 
non-regulatory program called the USA National Phenology 
Network. 
On December 26, 2008, in its 2008 Fiscal Year Consolidated 
Appropriations Bill, Congress authorized funding for EPA to 
propose and finalize a rule on mandatory reporting of greenhouse 
gas emissions.110  This was a very important step for the federal 
government because a national approach to mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions cannot be effective without first 
knowing current emissions by sector and then monitoring the 
decline over time.111  Congress required EPA to issue the 
proposed rule under the Clean Air Act by September 26, 2008, 
and the final rule by June 26, 2009.112  The proposal was not 
signed until early in the Obama Administration, on March 10, 
2009, and published in the Federal Register on April 10, 2009.113
EPA went well beyond the usual public notice and comment 
requirements for rulemaking contained in Section 307(d) of the 
Clean Air Act.
 
114
 
 109. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A 
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and 
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 286 (2005). 
  While no public meetings are required under 
 110. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 6, 121 Stat. 
1844, 2128 (2008). 
 111. Problems associated with the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme’s failure to have robust baseline data can be found in, INT’L CLIMATE 
CHANGE PROGRAMS, THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOLS’ CLEAN DEVELOPMENT 
MECHANISM 17-20 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09151. pdf. 
 112. EPA was required to:  
‘develop and publish a draft rule not later than 9 months after the date of 
enactment of this Act, and a final rule not later than 18 months after the 
date of enactment of this Act, to require mandatory reporting of GHG 
emissions above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy of 
the United States.’  
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 6, 121 Stat. 1844, 2128 
(2008). 
 113. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,448 
(proposed Apr. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 89). 
 114. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2006). 
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the Clean Air Act before publication of the proposed rule, 115 EPA 
conducted extensive outreach and held more than 100 meetings 
with over 250 stakeholders, including trade associations, 
potentially affected industries, state, local, and tribal govern-
ment, environmental groups and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).116  At these meetings, EPA 
shared information about the proposed rule and encouraged input 
from the stakeholders.  EPA also established technical work 
groups that “followed up with stakeholders on a variety of 
methodological, technical, and policy issues.”117
Given the expertise that states and local governments have 
developed on many aspects of climate change and the experience 
they have had with implementing climate change programs, it is 
important that the federal government, in developing climate 
change regulations and policies, take advantage of the lessons 
learned.  To that end, EPA met with state and regional 
organizations already involved in greenhouse gas reporting 
programs, such as the California Air Resources Board, The 
Climate Registry, and the Western Climate Initiative,
 
118 and 
“benefited from the leadership the States have shown in 
developing these programs and their experiences” and built upon 
those experiences to develop the proposed Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Rule.119
EPA held two public meetings on the proposed rule, one in 
Arlington, Virginia, and the other in Sacramento, California.
 
120
 
 115. Under Section 307(d) of the Clean Air Act, EPA is not required to engage 
the public before the proposal is published. Id. Upon publication of the proposal 
in the Federal Register, EPA is only required to establish a docket and 
procedures for viewing the docket, provide a statement of basis and purpose, 
and specify the period for public comment and procedures for receiving 
comments. Id. § 7607(d)(2)-(4). 
  
 116. Mandatory Reporting on Greenhouse Gasses, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,457 (Apr. 
10, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 86, 87, 89, et seq.). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. EPA also benefited from existing federal programs involving 
greenhouse gas reporting, such as EPA’s Climate Leaders, Combined Heat and 
Power Partnership, SmartWay Transport Partnership voluntary programs, 
DOE’s 1605(b) Voluntary Registry, as well as mandatory reporting programs 
such as EPA’s acid rain and NOx budget trading programs. Id. at 16,457-16,459. 
 120. Id. at 16,448. 
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The Agency also employed live audio web-streaming for remote 
participants in a novel approach to increase stakeholder access to 
the public meetings;121 approximately 150 people took advantage 
of this option.122  Even after publication of the proposed rule, 
EPA continued this very active outreach and by late July 2009, 
had interacted with several thousands of people through face to 
face meetings in both EPA’s headquarters office in Washington, 
D.C. and several EPA regional offices throughout the country, 
and conducted or participated in approximately ten to twenty 
webinars, conference calls, and trade association meetings.123  
The EPA Administrator signed the final rule on September 22, 
2009, and EPA used an “open door policy” for public input all the 
way through to promulgation of the final rule.124
While the full benefits of this collaborative approach cannot 
yet be measured, this robust
 
125
2.  Geological Sequestration Rule 
 form of public participation can be 
considered as an alternative to negotiated rulemaking when the 
government decides that it lacks the internal or external political 
support or time for an agreement-seeking process.   
On July 25, 2008, EPA published the Proposed Federal 
Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control Program 
 
 121. Telephone Interview with Katherine Sibold, Program Manager, Office of 
Atmospheric Programs, U.S. EPA (July 29, 2009). Approximately 200 people 
attended in person, indicating that the web-streaming increased attendance by 
roughly 75%. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. All tolled, EPA met with over 4,000 people and 135 groups by the time 
the final rule was issued. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. NO. EPA-HQ-
OAR-2008-0508, PREAMBLE TO EPA FINAL RULE, MANDATORY REPORTING OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES 19 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ 
downloads09/Preamble SecI-II.pdf. 
 124. Id. 
 125. A detailed discussion of three examples of EPA negotiated rulemaking 
and four examples of OSHA negotiated rulemaking can be found in, Charles C. 
Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and 
Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 141 (1999). See also Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, 
Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 
(2000) (suggesting that, based on empirical data, negotiated rulemaking is 
superior to conventional rulemaking). 
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for Carbon Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells126 under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act’s Underground Injection Control 
program.127  This proposal was, in part, the product of a 
stakeholder process that, like the Greenhouse Gas Reporting 
Rule, went beyond the normal statutory public process 
requirements.  EPA held two facilitated public stakeholder 
workshops, in December 2007, and February 2008, with 
participants from industry, environmental groups, utilities, 
academia, States, and the general public.128  At the first 
workshop, EPA listened to stakeholders’ perspectives and 
concerns and discussed, among other things, the rulemaking 
process.129  In the second workshop, EPA discussed how current 
Underground Injection Control (UIC) program elements could be 
tailored to geological carbon sequestration and conducted smaller 
sessions to discuss key technical issues.130  A diverse group of 
stakeholders engaged in the information exchange, including 
states, tribes, local government, water utilities, and associations 
in the drinking water and geology sectors.131  EPA indicated in its 
July 25th proposal that “technical discussions and stakeholder 
feedback from these workshops were used to inform today’s 
proposal.”132
EPA used an outside facilitator to further its goal of 
information exchange
 
133
 
 126. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control 
Program for Carbon Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,492 
(July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 144, 146) [hereinafter Federal 
Requirements]; see Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 
(2006); Underground Injection Control Program, 40 C.F.R. pt. 144 (2009). 
 during development of the proposed rule 
on geological sequestration.  In one of the facilitated stakeholder 
meetings, EPA recognized the importance of proposing the rule in 
an expedited fashion while incorporating new information over 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 300(h) (2006); 40 C.F.R. pt. 140-48 (2009). 
 128. Federal Requirements, supra note 126, at 43,501. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC WORKSHOP TO 
DISCUSS PROPOSED UIC REGULATIONS FOR GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON 
DIOXIDE (2008), http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw000/uic/pdfs/page_uic_washingtondc 
_feburay2008_summary.pdf. 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
SIEGEL  
2009-10] COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 289 
time as an adaptive component of the regulation.134  EPA also 
indicated that it may accept new data for consideration after the 
rule is written through a notice of data availability and sought 
stakeholder input on how to ensure adaptability of the rule.135  
The adaptive approach discussed during the information 
exchange was incorporated into the proposed rule as a way to 
strike the balance between the fast pace needed for 
implementation of geological sequestration and the importance of 
tracking new data and information gained during 
implementation.136
One topic of discussion that arose during the information 
exchange was whether EPA could develop improved methods for 
public participation on UIC permits.  In its proposed rule, EPA 
sought comment on whether advanced information gathering and 
dissemination methods should be employed.
 
137  Existing public 
participation requirements require: a thirty-day notice and 
comment period; public notice via newspapers, postings, or 
mailings to interested parties; a fact sheet; a statement of basis; 
and a summary of the responses to comments.138  There are also 
procedures for public hearings, public meetings, and advisory 
groups.139  EPA acknowledged in the proposal that newer 
methods for more robust interaction with the public have become 
available, such as “roundtables, constituency meetings, charrettes 
(workshops designed to involve the public in a planning or design 
process), information gathering sessions, cable TV, and the 
Internet.”140  EPA sought comment on employing newer forms of 
public participation requirements and also requested comments 
on engaging communities in the site characterization process as 
soon as candidate locations for wells are identified.141
 
 134. Id. at 4. 
  As this 
example suggests, an information exchange process can lead to 
consideration of issues that go beyond the limited subject matter 
 135. Id. at 7. 
 136. Federal Requirements, supra note 126, at 43,522. 
 137. Id. at 43,523. 
 138. Procedures for Decisionmaking Decisions Making, 40 C.F.R. § 124 (2009). 
 139. Public Participation in Programs Under the Resource Conservation 
Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Water Act, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 25.5-25.7 (2009). 
 140. Federal Requirements, supra note 126, at 43,523. 
 141. Id. 
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of the rule and assist the government to more broadly improve 
public participation.  It can also lead to a dialogue about using 
adaptive management in climate change decision making. 
3.   USA National Phenology Network 
As illustrated by EPA’s approach to public participation for 
the Greenhouse Gas Reporting rule and the Geological 
Sequestration rule, information exchange can occur in the context 
of one agency seeking input from diverse stakeholders so that the 
agency can make better decisions on climate change.  Another 
type of information exchange occurs when multiple stakeholders 
come together in a non-regulatory context to enter into a 
collaborative process for gathering and sharing information 
without any single entity being in a lead role or decision-making 
capacity.  An example of this context is the USA National 
Phenology Network, which brings together a wide range of 
stakeholders including, federal agencies, state and local 
governments, citizen scientists, non-profit groups, educators, and 
students to monitor the impacts of climate change on plants and 
animals in the United States.142
Phenology is the study of recurring plant and animal life 
cycle events, such as “leafing and flowering of plants, maturation 
of agricultural crops, emergence of insects, and migration of 
birds.”
 
143
Among the many partners in this effort are several federal 
agencies, including the EPA, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Forest Service.
  These life cycle events have been shifting as a result of 
climate change.  The USA National Phenology Network uses the 
power of the Internet to empower stakeholders to enter 
phenological observations into an online database that can be 
used to assist decision-makers in responding to climate change. 
144
 
 142. National Phenology Network, http://www.usanpn.org/ (last visited Nov. 
26, 2009). 
  It is worth 
noting that the USA National Phenology Network was not the 
 143. Id. 
 144. National Phenology Network USA-NPN Partner Relationships, 
http://www.usanpn.org/?q=npn_partners (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). The federal 
agencies provide a wide range of support, including the Network’s cyber 
infrastructure, planning and implementation workshops, pilot programs, as well 
as programmatic support for education and outreach. 
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collective brainchild of these agencies.  Rather, it was initiated by 
two individuals, one from academia and one from the U.S. 
Geological Survey.145
 B.  Recommendations 
  The founding of this network illustrates 
that opportunities for collaborative decision-making on climate 
change involving federal partners can be initiated by experts and 
institutions both outside and inside the federal government.  
Given the broad range of knowledge in academia, the private 
sector, and state and local governments, the federal government 
can look for opportunities to engage in collaborative decision-
making on projects initiated by non-federal entities. 
The recommendations process differs from information 
exchange in that it is intended to draw upon the collective 
viewpoint or recommendation146 of a group of diverse 
stakeholders, typically selected by EPA to represent a balance of 
different interests.147 The group will make recommendations 
based upon a consensus, majority vote, or some combination of 
the two.  Both EPA and the stakeholders enter this process 
understanding that the recommendations might not be fully 
adopted by EPA and, even if adopted, EPA’s decision might not be 
fully supported by the stakeholders.148
An excellent example of the recommendations process 
involves the Advanced Coal Technology Workgroup (Workgroup), 
a subcommittee of the Clean Air Act Advisory Committee formed 
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
 
149
 
 145. This Network was initiated in 2005, when co-founders Mark Schwartz, a 
professor at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukie, and Julio Betancourt, a senior 
scientist at the U.S. Geological Survey, independently saw the need for the 
Network and teamed up to plan a workshop for developing an implementation 
plan. See National Phenology Network, History, http://www.usanpn.org 
/?q=history (last visited Nov. 26, 2009); see also National Phenology Network, 
Board of Directors, http://www.usanpn.org/?q=board-directors (last visited Nov. 
26, 2009). 
 to make 
 146. The recommendations process often triggers the requirements of the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006) (which can apply 
when a federal agency is seeking collective advice). 
 147. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 11. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app.2 § 9(c) (2006).  
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recommendations to EPA.150 The Workgroup was charged with 
initiating a one-year process to identify potential barriers and 
opportunities under the Clean Air Act to creating incentives for 
the development and deployment of advanced coal 
technologies.151  Advanced coal technology includes carbon 
capture and sequestration approaches such as Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle technology.152  The Workgroup was 
also charged with ensuring a diversity of stakeholder views and 
perspectives and included, among others, members from utilities, 
pollution control providers, coal companies, state and tribal 
government, NGOs and environmental organizations, public 
utility commissions, academia, consultants, and experts on 
carbon capture and storage.153  EPA, the Department of Energy, 
and the Department of Defense participated as non-voting 
members of the Workgroup.154
The Workgroup met in person or via teleconference 
approximately fifteen times over the course of one year
 
155 and 
produced a final report in January 2008, with recommendations 
to EPA.156  The Workgroup achieved consensus on thirteen 
recommendations, most of which related to reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions through advanced coal technology.  In 
pursuing consensus on the thirteen recommendations, the 
Workgroup agreed, pursuant to a Workgroup Charter (Charter) 
to “operate according to a ‘substantial consensus’ principle.”157
 
 150. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Advanced Coal Technology Work Group 
Background, http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech_background.html (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2009).  
  
Substantial consensus under the Charter meant that, “not every 
member might completely agree with every decision the Work 
 151. Advanced Coal Technology Workgroup-Background and Other Infor-
mation, http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech_background.html (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2009) (this workgroup is currently inactive). 
 152. Id. 
 153. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY ADVANCED COAL TECHNOLOGY WORK 
GROUP, FINAL REPORT 8-9 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech/2008_01 
_final_report.pdf [hereinafter EPA ADVANCED COAL TECH. WORK GROUP]. 
 154. Id. at 9. 
 155. See Advanced Coal Technology Workgroup—Past Meetings, http://www. 
epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech_past.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (agenda and 
presentations for each meeting are available for download). 
 156. EPA ADVANCED COAL TECH. WORK GROUP, supra note 153. 
 157. Id. at 9. 
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Group made.  In those cases, the Work Group attempted to 
balance views to the extent possible in reporting on the 
recommendation and incorporating alternate viewpoints.”158
Among the recommendations in the final report was one 
involving carbon capture and storage.  Specifically, the Work-
group recommended that, given “the potential national 
importance of geological sequestration, EPA should designate a 
new well class for geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide in its 
upcoming UIC rulemaking” under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act.
 
159  This recommendation went beyond the Workgroup’s 
original charge to examine barriers and opportunities under the 
Clean Air Act and, in part, led to the stakeholder process for the 
UIC rule160 discussed in Part V section A of this article.161
 C.   Agreements 
  Thus, 
a process in one category along the continuum can lead to 
opportunities for collaboration in other categories. 
Agreement processes are those designed to reach a mutually 
acceptable decision through agency/stakeholder consensus that 
the parties agree to implement.162  The agreement may or may 
not be legally binding but, regardless, is likely to create a sense of 
ownership among the stakeholders that encourages widespread 
support for implementation.163  The classic example of an 
agreement-seeking collaborative process is a negotiated 
rulemaking.164
 
 158. Id. 
  As noted earlier, in light of the potential deluge of 
 159. Id. at 5. 
 160. See Robert Brenner, Director, Office of Policy Analysis & Review, Office of 
Air, EPA, and Stephen Heare, Director, Drinking Water Prot. Div., Office of 
Water, EPA, Presentation at EPA Public Workshop on Geologic Sequestration of 
CO2 : Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide Under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act’s Underground Injection Program (Feb. 26, 2008), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/ogwdw000/uic/pdfs/page_uic_washingtondc_feburay2008_presentations.
pdf. 
 161. See supra notes 106–45 and accompanying text. 
 162. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 13. 
 163. Id. at 14. 
 164. For a detailed discussion of three examples of EPA negotiated 
rulemaking and four examples of OSHA negotiated rulemaking, see Caldart & 
Ashford, supra note 125, at 141; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING FACT SHEET (2009), http://www.epa.gov/adr/factsheet 
regneg.pdf. 
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rulemaking165
1.  Multi-Stakeholder Motor Vehicle Agreement 
 that may flow from climate change legislation, 
negotiated rulemaking is an excellent option for collaborative 
decision-making.  However, agreement-seeking collaborative 
processes arise in quite a wide range of contexts, including 
settlement agreements, statements of principles, consensus 
permits, among others, as illustrated by the examples below. 
On May 19, 2009, President Obama set into motion a “new 
national policy aimed at both increasing fuel economy and 
reducing greenhouse gas pollution for all new cars and trucks 
sold in the United States.”166
  
  The policy is the result of 
collaboration between the EPA, Department of Transportation 
(DOT), State of California, major automobile manufacturers, 
United Auto Workers Union, and leading environmental groups.  
According to EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, as reported in 
the White House press release on the collaboration: 
The President brought all stakeholders to the table and 
came up with a plan to help the auto industry, safeguard 
consumers, and protect human health and the environment 
for all Americans . . . A supposedly “unsolvable” problem was 
solved by unprecedented partnerships. 
 
This collaborative effort came about in the context of one of 
the most highly contested areas of climate change law and 
policy—greenhouse gas regulation of motor vehicles.  The 
automobile industry, California, and other states have been in 
litigation for years over state greenhouse gas emissions standards 
for motor vehicles.167
 
 165. See supra Part II.B.3. 
  Compounding the complexity of the issues 
was EPA’s decision in 2008 to deny California a waiver from 
 166. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, President Obama 
Announces National Fuel Efficiency Policy (May 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-AnnouncesNation 
al-Fuel-Efficiency-Policy/. 
 167. For a list of cases involving challenges to vehicle standards, see Columbia 
Law School Climate Litigation Chart, http://www.climatecasechart.com/ (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
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preemption under the Clean Air Act’s motor vehicle provisions168 
and DOT’s delayed promulgation of fuel economy standards 
under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.169  As a result of 
the collaborative effort that led to the White House 
announcement on May 19, 2009, key parties signed letters of 
commitment in which they agreed to end litigation regarding 
these issues and also committed to specific terms for the vehicle 
model years 2009-2016.170
Unlike the public process that took place in the context of the 
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule and Underground Injection Rule, 
the collaboration on control of greenhouse gases from motor 
vehicles was done without transparency.  While no formal 
explanation was provided by the parties about the rationale for 
conducting the process in a closed fashion, the complexity of the 
issues and longstanding nature of the conflict between the parties 
may have made it difficult to successfully collaborate and reach 
an agreement using an open process.  This suggests that while 
transparency may be a positive element of successful collabor-
ation in many contexts, there may be occasions, particularly in 
agreement-seeking settings where the dispute between the 
parties is already joined, when the primary stakeholders may see 
transparency as a deterrent to a successful resolution.  A broad 
lesson learned from this example is that there is no one “right” 
set of tools for each collaborative process along the spectrum.  
Rather, the design of each collaborative effort must be tailored to 
the specifics of the situation and needs of the parties. 
 
2.   National Climate Change and Wildlife Science 
Center 
Recognizing the lack of scientific information regarding plant 
and animal adaptation to climate change, the U.S. Geological 
 
 168. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
 169. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 32901 (2006)). 
 170. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Transportation and Climate at 
Regulations and Standards, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations.htm 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (providing the commitment letters, terms of the 
agreement and more details about the announcement). 
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Survey, the science agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior, 
established the National Climate Change and Wildlife Science 
Center (NCCWSC) to, among other things, link physical climate 
models with ecological and biological responses.171  The broad 
goal of the NCCWSC is to use forecasting products from climate 
and other models to assist fish, wildlife, and land managers in 
their design of suitable adaptive management approaches for 
their programs.172  In carrying out this broad goal, the NCCWSC 
plans to “build on existing regional partnerships to foster joint 
decision making and prioritization by scientists and managers.173
As an early step in furthering the work of the NCCWSC, in 
December 2008, the USGS convened a workshop with 200 
participants from a broad array of stakeholders including state 
and federal agencies, tribal organizations, academia and 
NGOs.
 
174  The workshop sought to “identify research needs and 
priorities, devise strategies for partnerships and collaboration, 
and to begin to design a structure for the [NCCWSC].”175  
Recognizing the variety of scientific methods to predict impacts 
from climate change, one goal of the meeting was to find ways to 
“link together different scientific approaches and models for 
forecasting the impacts of climate change and adaptation on fish, 
wildlife and their habitats.”176
In order to build on the December 2008 workshop, the USGS 
convened a series of regional workshops in spring 2009 to “help 
develop the structure of the NCCWSC and partnership 
mechanisms needed to link climate science and national resource 
management in the United States.”
   
177
 
 171. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE AND WILDLIFE SERVICE 
CTR. (2009), http://nccw.usgs.gov/documents/NCCWSC-information-031609.pdf 
(noting that Congress included $1.5 million in the FY 2008 Appropriations Bill 
for USGS to create the Center). 
  The structure was 
envisioned as: 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE & WILDLIFE SCI. 
CTR., SUMMARY WORKSHOP REPORT 2 (2008), http://nccw.usgs.gov/documents/ 
NCCWSC_Summary_Work shop_Report.pdf. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE & WILDLIFE SCI. CTR., 
EASTERN REGIONAL WORK-SHOP, WORKSHOP SUMMARY 1 (2009), 
http://nccw.usgs.gov/documents/NCCWSC_Eastern_Workshop_Summary .pdf. 
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[A] collaborative system of NCCWSC Regional Climate 
Science Hubs working with a national headquarters and 
with external adaptive application partnerships jointly 
organized by willing partners. These partnerships would 
create feedback loops to inform science priorities and 
adaptive resource management at regional and finer 
scales.178  
Options for the structure of the NCCWSC and its hubs were 
discussed at each of the three regional workshops.179  Following 
the workshops, USGS issued a report outlining how joint 
decisions will be made under the umbrella of the NCCWSC.180  
Unlike a negotiated rulemaking or the multi-stakeholder motor 
vehicle agreement, which are temporally limited endeavors to 
reach one final agreement, the NCCWSC is an example of a 
program in which decisions will be made on an ongoing basis by 
the parties.  This can be particularly powerful in the context of 
climate change because it allows for an iterative process that can 
support adaptive management. Specifically, an adaptive 
management approach can be used to plan for species at risk.  
Information from the NCCWSC can assist land managers in 
conducting anticipatory adaptation before significant impacts are 
experienced.  Examples include forest management in advance of 
significant species decline, creation of habitat corridors for species 
faced with migration, and prohibition of road development that 
would fragment habitats.181  The information can also be used for 
reactive adaptation once the impacts have occurred.  Examples 
include controlling invasive species that have, due to climate 
change, gained the opportunity to destroy habitats of native 
species, and reintroduction of native species to former habitats.182
 
 178. Id. 
  
The collaborative structure of the NCCWSC appears to reflect a 
concept referred to by one author as “collaborative management,” 
 179. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE & WILDLIFE SCI. CTR., 
2009 NATIONAL WORKSHOP, WORKSHOP SUMMARY 1 (2009), http://nccw.usgs.gov/ 
documents/NCCWSC_2009_National_Workshop_Summary.pdf. 
 180. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE & WILDLIFE SCI. CTR., 
PROPOSED 5-YEAR STRATEGY (2009), http://nccw.usgs.gov/doc uments/NCCWSC_ 
5_year_strategy_ver_7-13-09b.pdf. 
 181. Glicksman, supra note 40, at 888-91. 
 182. Id. at 848. 
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in which multiple stakeholders operate in a non-hierarchical 
cooperative effort to make decisions in response to a shared 
problem.183
3.   Methane to Markets 
  This structure will allow NCCWSC stakeholders to 
react to changing information and take adaptive measures in 
response. 
The Methane to Markets Partnership (Partnership) is a non-
binding voluntary international framework for reducing methane 
emissions by recovering methane gas for use as an energy 
source.184 Methane, which is twenty-five times more potent as a 
greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide,185 is addressed by the 
Partership through a multi-lateral, bi-lateral, and private sector 
collaboration to facilitate methane recovery projects in four 
sectors: (1) agriculture, in particular, animal waste management; 
(2) coal mines; (3) landfills; and (4) oil and gas systems.186  The 
Partnership was launched by the United States in 2004 with 
fourteen nations and as of this year, there are thirty partner 
nations.187
A Steering Committee governs the overall policies, 
procedures, and framework of the Partnership, provides guidance 
to subcommittees, and conducts an annual review of the 
Partnership’s progress.
 
188
 
 183. See Babcock, supra note 50, at 473 (discussing the federal-state 
consensus model, termed “collaborative management” used in the Clean Water 
Act’s National Estuary Program). 
  The Steering Committee makes 
 184. Methane to Markets, About the Partnership, http://www.methaneto 
markets.org/m2m2009/about/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). See also 
Jeffrey McGee & Dr. Ros Taplin, The Asia-Pacific Partnership and the United 
States' International Climate Change Policy, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 
179 (2008) (providing information about other voluntary international 
partnerships). 
 185. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/ 
0573(2007).pdf (based upon the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report). 
 186. Methane to Markets, http://www.methanetomarkets.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2009). 
 187. Methane to Markets, Partner Countries, http://www.methanetomarkets. 
org/m2m2009/partners/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 188. Methane to Markets, Terms of Reference, http://www.methanetomarkets. 
org/m2m2009/about/terms.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
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decisions by consensus and meets at least once each year.189  It is 
comprised of a Chair and twenty member nations.190  The Chair 
is the U.S. EPA Assistant Administrator for Air.191  Although the 
Chair is a United States official, she serves as a neutral 
facilitator to help move the Steering Committee toward consensus 
in its decision making.192  Independent of the Chair, the United 
States also has a non-neutral member on the Steering Committee 
who represents the United States interests.193  This program is a 
model for future partnerships in which nations engage in 
facilitated decision making on climate change by consensus.  
While major international negotiations, such as the Conference of 
the Parties meeting in Copenhagen, present far more complexity 
and therefore require more sophisticated process design,194
4.  Dallas Sustainable Skylines Initiative 
 there 
will be many opportunities for the kind of partnership forged in 
the Methane to Markets program. 
In March 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding was 
entered into by the EPA, the City of Dallas, and the North 
Central Texas Council of Governments, for the purpose of 
developing and implementing a three-year partnership known as 
the Dallas Sustainable Skylines Initiative (Initiative).195  The 
purpose of this three party Initiative was to promote 
sustainability in Dallas (with an emphasis on air quality) through 
voluntary programs, and serve as a model for other such 
initiatives.196
 
 189. Id. 
 
 190. Methane to Markets, Steering, http://www.methanetomarkets.org/m2m 
2009/steering/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Telephone Interview with Paul Gunning, Chief, Non-CO2 Programs 
Branch, Climate Change Division, U.S. EPA (June 9, 2009). 
 193. Id. See also Methane to Markets, Steering, supra note 190. 
 194. For discussion of some potential issues and options for a Copenhagen 
agreement, see Hunter, supra note 10, at 247; see also Annie Petsonk, Docking 
Stations: Designing a More Welcoming Architecture for a Post-2012 Framework 
to Combat Climate Change, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 433 (2009). 
 195. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, the City of Dallas, and the North Central Texas Council of 
Governments (Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Dallas Memorandum], available at 
http://www.sustainableskylines.org/Dallas/documents/mou2007.pdf.  
 196. Id. 
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Prior to development of the Memorandum of Understanding, 
the Initiative was kicked off in December 2006 with a two-day 
facilitated brainstorming session that resulted in fifty-eight 
project ideas.197  The parties spent the next three months 
winnowing down the project ideas to a total of seven.198  While 
climate change was not specifically identified in the 
Memorandum of Understanding as one of the purposes of the 
Initiative, most of the seven selected projects mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions.  The projects include: completion of a greenhouse 
gas strategy for Dallas; implementation of a green buildings 
project and a renewable energy/energy efficiency outreach 
program; replacement of existing taxis with green taxis; 
establishment of a program to reduce the urban heat island effect 
in Dallas; and provision of on-site technical assistance to industry 
on, among other things, energy efficiency.199
The seven projects were selected on a consensus basis and 
defined in the Memorandum of Understanding as a two-thirds 
majority, provided that the majority includes the City of 
Dallas.
 
200  The Initiative was started with $250,000 of EPA seed 
money which drew another $3.7 million from non-federal 
government entities and the private sector,201 as well as 
approximately twenty partners helping with project 
implementation and advisory services.202
 
 197. Telephone Interview with James Yarbrough, Climate Coordinator, 
Multimedia Planning and Permitting Division, EPA Region 6, Dallas, Texas 
(May 29, 2009) [hereinafter Yarbrough Interview]. 
  Not only is this 
 198. Id. 
 199. See generally Sustainable Skylines—Dallas, Current Projects, 
http://www.sustainableskylines.org/Dallas/current_projects.html (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2009). 
 200. Dallas Memorandum, supra note 195, at 2. While the projects were 
selected by the parties to the MOU rather than through an extensive public 
process, there was an opportunity for the public to weigh in during the three 
month winnowing period. See also Yarbrough Interview, supra note 197. 
 201. Yarbrough Interview, supra note 197. 
 202. Sustainable Skylines—Dallas, Sustainable Skylines Partners, http://www 
.sustainableskylines.org/Dallas/partners.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).  
While there are only three parties to the agreement, the Memorandum of 
Understanding provides that “the Parties will seek cooperation with appropriate 
State agencies, other federal agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
commercial entities on Initiative projects, and, as determined by the Parties, 
other participants may join the Initiative in either advisory or Initiative project 
implementation roles for particular projects.” Dallas Memorandum, supra note 
195, at 2. 
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Initiative an example of an agreement process related to climate 
change, but it also represents an excellent example of how the 
gravitas of the federal government in a climate change initiative 
can help bring other stakeholders and funders to the table.203
 D.  Stakeholder Action 
  It 
also illustrates that the federal government does not always need 
to be the key decision maker in collaborative processes 
particularly when, as in this case, the process does not stem from 
federal regulatory authority.  In this example, the two-thirds 
majority had to include the City of Dallas, not EPA, because the 
primary goal was to assist the City of Dallas with sustainability 
planning.  Nonetheless, the federal government can play an 
important role in partnership opportunities of this kind.  This 
example also highlights the fine line that sometimes exists 
between agreement processes involving the federal government 
and stakeholder action processes, discussed in the next section, in 
which the federal government plays a support role for external 
parties seeking agreement. 
The stakeholder action category differs from the prior 
categories in that the government’s purpose in initiating the 
collaborative process is to empower stakeholders to take their 
own action, rather than to collaborate with the government on a 
government led decision.  This approach puts the agency in the 
role of a catalyst for action that will be taken collaboratively by 
other parties.204
 
 203. EPA has identified seven keys to successful collaborative problem-
solving. One of those keys is to have a “convener of stature” to “catalyze 
collaboration by legitimizing the process, encouraging stakeholder participation, 
and shouldering initial organizational costs to bring parties together to address 
a shared problem.” U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Environmental Innovation, 
Keys to Successful Collaborative Problem Solving, http://www.epa. 
gov/NCEI/collaboration/seven_keys.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
  One of the most effective ways that the federal 
government can promote climate change mitigation and 
adaptation is to empower non-federal stakeholders through a 
variety of support mechanisms.  Many agencies have particular 
expertise with greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation tools 
such as downscale modeling, greenhouse gas emissions 
inventories, and emissions reduction measures.  Federal agencies 
 204. DALTON & HARTER, supra note 13, at 15 
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can therefore provide much needed technical support to state and 
local government.  In addition, they can provide process support, 
for example, by creating networks of state and local governments, 
and financial support, through grants and other financial 
mechanisms. 
There are a host of stakeholder action initiatives that have 
been developed by EPA’s Climate Protection Partnerships 
Division of the Office of Air and Radiation.  One such program is 
EPA’s State Climate and Energy Partnership Program, a 
voluntary program in which EPA provides tools and analyses to 
states seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.205  The 
Program was launched with eleven states in 2005 and now 
includes sixteen states.206  EPA also developed a Guide 
containing sixteen of the best practices for addressing state 
climate and clean energy challenges.207  Among other things, the 
Guide provides process support for states interested in developing 
a clean energy and environment action plan.208  For example, the 
Guide includes information on how to create a state collaborative 
process, establish goals, identify clean energy policies and 
programs, design and evaluate impacts of these policies and 
programs and, finally, recommend specific actions for decision 
makers.209  The Guide also references the many tools that EPA 
offers or supports to help states assess the benefits of policies 
they choose to include in their action plans.210  These include 
tools for modeling energy policy and measuring economic, 
environmental and human health benefits.211
 
 205. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Clean Energy, Clean Energy State Partner 
Network, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/state-and-local/state 
-partnership.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT GUIDE TO 
ACTION BEST PRACTICES AND ACTION STEPS FOR STATES (2006), 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents /gta/guide_action_full.pdf. 
 208. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DEVELOPING A CLEAN ENERGY-
ENVIRONMENT ACTION PLAN (2006), http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/ 
gta/guide_action_chap2.pdf. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 2-6, fig. 2.1. 
 211. Id. See also U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Clean Energy, Tools and 
Resources, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/state-and-local/tool 
s.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
SIEGEL  
2009-10] COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 303 
In addition, EPA established a State Technical Forum to 
promote clean energy efforts through peer exchange, expert 
presentations, and the sharing of documents.212  EPA facilitates 
this monthly discussion among state energy and environmental 
agencies and public utility commissions.  Among the titles of 
recent monthly forums are Federal Climate Legislation and 
Implications for State Energy Offices, State Programs for 
Building Local Government Climate & Energy Planning Capacity, 
State Clean Energy Approaches to the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, and Clean Energy Workforce 
Development: Growing Green Jobs to Achieve Climate and Energy 
Goals.213
One of EPA’s more recent initiatives is the Climate Showcase 
Communities Grant Program.
 
214 In its Fiscal Year 2009 
Appropriations Bill, Congress authorized EPA to administer a 
$10 million competitive grant program for local communities 
seeking to implement climate change initiatives.215  One of the 
goals of the program is to develop replicable models that can be 
transferred to other communities seeking to address climate 
change.216  EPA will assist the grant recipients with “peer 
exchange, training, and technical support.”217  For example, EPA 
will help the communities with reporting metrics and tracking 
results, annual training workshops, and brainstorming about 
peer ideas.218  In order to achieve the goal of replicating best 
practices, EPA will promote transfer of these initiatives to other 
communities through “meetings, conference calls, webinars, and 
online discussion forums or collaborative workspaces.”219
 
 212. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Clean Energy, State Technical Forum, 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/state-and-local/state-
forum.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
  EPA 
will use the program as an opportunity to foster collaborative 
 213. See generally id (for materials from these and other monthly discussions). 
 214. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Clean Energy, Climate Showcase 
Communities Grant, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-program s/state-
and-local/showcase.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. JULIA ROSENBERG, OVERVIEW OF EPA CLIMATE SHOWCASE 
COMMUNITIES GRANT PROGRAM PRESENTATION (Jun. 12, 2009) http://climate 
communities.us/documents/showcase_ presentation.ppt.  
 219. Id. 
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processes on climate change in two important ways.  First, in its 
selection of grant recipients, EPA will favor proposals that “build 
and leverage partnerships across multiple stakeholder groups.”220  
Second, EPA intends to use this stakeholder action program in 
order to foster a “collaborative partnership between communities 
and the federal government.”221
EPA Regional Offices are also involved in stakeholder action 
initiatives.  For example, EPA’s Region 1 office in New England 
developed the EPA New England Community Energy 
Challenge.
 
222  Region 1 provides technical assistance to communi-
ties that agree to: (1) benchmark the energy performance of 
municipal buildings and facilities; (2) set a reduction goal of at 
least 10%; and (3) promote energy efficiency and renewable 
energy to the community.223  EPA’s Region 10 office in the 
Northwest provides greenhouse gas inventory technical support 
to state, local and tribal government.224  Region 10 also provides 
technical assistance on energy efficiency and renewable energy 
options to stakeholders in their region and donated a half-time 
staff person to the Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation to support their mitigation and adaptation 
activities.225
 
 220. Id. 
  As the national climate change program grows, it is 
likely that regional offices in EPA and other federal agencies will 
take a bigger role in supporting stakeholder action, particularly 
on issues, like adaptation, that are more local and regional in 
nature.  Because of their close contacts with state and local 
officials, regional offices of federal agencies can serve as co-
conveners and facilitators of collaborative decision making 
processes on climate change. 
 221. Id. 
 222. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Region 1: EPA New England, Community 
Energy Challenge: Promoting Energy Efficiency and Renewables in New 
England Cities and Towns, http://www.epa.gov/region1/eco/energy/energy-
challenge.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 223. Model Commitment Letter from [New England Community], to H. Curtis 
Spalding, Regional Administrator, EPA New England, http://www.epa.gov/reg 
ion1/eco/energy/other/commitment-letter.doc. 
 224. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 10, REGION 10 STRATEGIC 
ENDEAVOR FOR CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2008), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/ECOCOMM.NSF/0/525ad9b803f0da4c882574340001
3bfb/$FILE/R10%20CE%20&%20CC%20SE%207-30.pdf. 
 225. Id. 
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VI.  COLLABORATION AMONG FEDERAL AGENCIES 
In order to effectively deploy any of the collaborative 
processes along the spectrum, from information exchange through 
stakeholder action, the federal government must strategically 
draw upon its resources.  After eight years of an Administration 
that did not sufficiently acknowledge or address the seriousness 
of climate change,226 the federal Executive Branch under 
President Obama has a lot of catching up to do.  Given the 
enormity and complexity of the issue, the task at hand is almost 
overwhelming.  In order to move forward effectively and marshal 
limited resources efficiently, collaboration among the federal 
agencies is essential.  As noted by Dr. Jane Lubchenco, 
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the challenge of climate change “will 
require an unprecedented level of coordination among federal 
agencies, along with our nongovernmental partners, to 
accomplish the goal of providing high quality, climate information 
and services that are user-friendly, responsive and relevant.” 227
Collaborative decision-making across multiple agencies with 
different missions will not be easy. Agencies are funded 
individually by Congress and each one has unique statutory 
mandates they must fulfill.  Thus, agencies may be resistant to 
expending resources on joint efforts and have difficulty 
overcoming a reflexive resistance to sharing their authority.
 
228
 
 226. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive 
Branches, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2008) (arguing that the federal Executive during 
the Bush Administration moved from simple inaction to outright 
obstructionism). 
  
Agencies are accustomed to going through their own deliberative 
process before announcing their thinking not only to the public 
but, to other federal agencies.  This tendency against 
 227. Written Testimony of Dr. Jane Lubchenco, Under Secretary of Commerce 
For Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA Administrator, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (Sept. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/Testimony/Lubchenco091609.pdf.  
One commentator likened the complexity of the coordination required on climate 
change to the complexity that inspired creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security.  See Rabe, supra note 57, at 790. 
 228. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Thirty-fourth Annual 
Administrative Law Issue Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 
795, 900 (2005). 
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transparency derives, in part, from fears about over-committing 
resources.  It also results from painful experiences with press 
coverage, and the resulting political fallout, prior to completing 
agency decision-making processes.  Therefore, to be successful, 
each agency will need sufficient resources and institutional 
capacity specifically for collaborative efforts on climate change, 
and to be able to overcome differences in bureaucratic cultures.229
Notwithstanding the challenges of coordination, no single 
agency can adequately address climate change on its own and, 
therefore, collaborative approaches within the federal family can 
help each agency achieve its mission.  There are many functions 
performed by the federal Executive Branch to address climate 
change, such as observations, monitoring, modeling, research, 
assessments, resource risk management, adaptation, and 
mitigation.  Each of these functions may be performed by 
different agencies with somewhat different goals using a variety 
of approaches and techniques. 
  
They will also need to embrace a more transparent decision 
making process that is necessary for effective collaborative 
processes. 
Recognizing the absence of a national program to monitor 
climate trends and issue predictions to support decision makers, 
the National Academy of Sciences has identified, as one of its key 
recommendations on climate change, the need to coordinate 
federal efforts to meet the growing demand for credible, 
understandable, and useful information.230
 
 229. Kerry E. Rodgers, The Limits of Collaborative Governance: Homeland 
Security and Environmental Protection at U.S. Ports, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 
233-34 (2007) (casting doubt on whether agencies can share leadership in a 
collaborative governance context). 
  In many circum-
stances, a particular function of one agency cannot be adequately 
performed without information derived from another agency.  For 
example, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) may 
decide to address the need for adaptation by increasing the size of 
culverts under federal highways to prepare for projected extreme 
precipitation events.  In order to properly design the culvert size, 
 230. COMM. ON STRATEGIC ADVICE ON THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. 
PROGRAM, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTRUCTURING FEDERAL CLIMATE 
RESEARCH TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2009), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12595#toc. 
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FHWA may need to obtain downscale modeling231
Moreover, when state and local governments, as well as other 
stakeholders, seek data, modeled results, research results, and 
assessments from the federal government, a coordinated response 
that takes into account the wealth of knowledge of all the 
agencies will, in many situations, be more user-friendly and 
robust than a disparate set of responses from multiple agencies.  
In addition, efforts to reduce the greenhouse gas footprint of the 
federal government itself could benefit from collaboration among 
the agencies.  Finally, federal agency resources are already 
stretched to the maximum even without the enormous task ahead 
on climate change.
 performed by 
NOAA that projects the extent and frequency of those extreme 
precipitation events.  Likewise, if both agencies engage in 
modeling to project extreme precipitation events but use different 
models, collaboration could assist them both in determining 
which model will best predict the adaptation needs of a particular 
situation. 
232
Some efforts are already underway to initiate collaboration 
within the federal government.  A meeting, entitled Adapting to 
Climate Change in the Southeast was held in Charleston, South 
Carolina in May 2008.
  Coordination will be an efficient way of 
leveraging limited resources. 
233
 
 231. Scientists take global models and “downscale” them to predict local and 
regional conditions. 
  Among the important issues identified 
during the breakout sessions were the need for better 
communication among the agencies on climate change 
adaptation, the benefit of providing a unified message from all 
the agencies while recognizing each agency’s particular niche, the 
need to communicate inherent uncertainties in climate change 
 232. Rabe, supra note 57, at 790. 
 233. Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Southeast Natural Res. 
Leadership Group, Adapting to Climate Change in the Southeast, Agency 
Presentation (May 27-29 2008), http://www.fws.gov/southeast/climate/pdfs/ 
NOAA%20NMFS%20Final%20Payne%20CC%20SENRLG%20052708.ppt. See 
also Northeast Reg’l Ocean Council, Interagency Workshop, New England 
Federal Partners Interagency Meeting on Climate Change in the Northeast 1 
(May 29, 2009), http://community.csc.noaa.gov/nroc/index.php?option=com_doc 
man&task=cat_view&gid=50&limit=5&limitstart=0&order=name&dir=ASC&It
emid=55.   
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data and modeling, and the importance of providing better 
downscale modeling to meet state information needs.234
In June 2009, a meeting of northeast regional federal agency 
officials was held to discuss roles and responsibilities with respect 
to climate change adaptation.
 
235  The purpose of the meeting was 
to “establish a foundation for federal agencies with climate 
related responsibilities to communicate and collaborate effectively 
and efficiently”236 on climate change adaptation.  The meeting 
participants identified a number of key issues for coordination 
including developing “regional consensus on climate scenarios, 
data sets, models, and projections for New England.”237  Included 
among the many important collaborative opportunities identified 
in the breakout sessions were: (1) working with stakeholders to 
identify their needs; (2) coordinating monitoring efforts across 
agencies; (3) conducting sea level rise mapping / bridging 
communication gaps; (4) forming an interagency group on 
knowledge sharing; and (5) identifying the most important 
indicators required for modeling climate change effects.238  
Perhaps one of the most significant issues identified as needing 
regional federal collaboration was downscaling climate 
predictions to spatial and temporal scales meaningful to decision 
makers in the regional area.239
In the Pacific Northwest, EPA, USGS, NOAA, the National 
Park Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recently 
formed the Pacific Northwest Climate Change Collaboration (C3) 
to, among other things, strengthen federal coordination on 
 
 
 234. SOUTHEAST NAT’L RES. LEADERSHIP GROUP, BREAKOUT SUMMARIES AND 
REPORT OUT & NEXT STEPS FROM REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
(2008), http://www.fws.gov/southeast/climate/pdfs/ClimateSENRLGBreakoutGr 
oupReportsCombined05302008.pdf. 
 235. New England Federal Partners Interagency Meeting on Climate Change 
in the Northeast, Full Agenda (June 2-4, 2009), http://community.csc.noaa.gov 
/nroc/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=50&limit=5&limitsta
rt=0&order=name&dir=ASC&Itemid=55 (scroll down to “Full Agenda_NE 
Interagency Climate Meeting”). 
 236. Id.  
 237. New England Federal Partners Interagency Meeting on Climate Change 
in the Northeast, Workshop Summary (June 2-4, 2009), http://community.csc. 
noaa.gov/nroc/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=50&Itemid=
55 (scroll down to “NE Interagency Climate Workshop Summary Report”). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
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climate change, align resources, and exchange and coordinate 
regional tools, data, and scientific knowledge.240  C3 has 
identified four initial projects they will undertake, including: (1) 
comparing existing agency policy and guidance on how to account 
for climate change impacts; (2) defining time and scale for climate 
change analyses; (3) conducting an inventory of research, tools, 
assessments, and downscaled global climate models; and (4) 
providing education and outreach materials.241
In addition to the above-referenced regional efforts, on 
August 22, 2008, EPA and the Departments of Commerce, 
Defense, Interior, and Agriculture entered into an interagency 
memorandum to cooperate on adaptation management of water-
related consequences of climate change.
 
242  Recognizing the 
impacts from rising sea levels, changes in rain and snow levels, 
and storm intensity, the memorandum empowers agency senior 
staff to coordinate on four items: (1) the sharing of water-related 
climate change information and data; (2) the exchange of 
information about climate change programs and activities related 
to water; (3) the consideration of research priorities related to 
climate change and water; and (4) the cooperative 
implementation of water-related climate change adaptation 
programs and projects.243
It is likely, however, that adequate collaboration within the 
federal government will not be fully realized without a central 
coordinating body. The National Research Council has 
recommended a national initiative for climate-related decision 
support that “will require unusually effective collaboration among 
many federal agencies” and “will demand strong leadership from 
 
 
 240. C3 Overview, Pacific Northwest Climate Change Collaboration (June 
2009) (on file with author). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Memorandum from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Administrator of 
Water, EPA, to Agency Senior Staff on Federal Agency Cooperation on 
Adaptation of Water-Related Programs to the Impacts of Climate Change 1 
(Aug. 22, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/water/climatechange/docs/ 
Agency_Senior_Staff_Fed_Agency_Coop_re_Adaption_of_Water-Related_Progra 
ms.pdf. 
 243. Id. 
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the Executive Office of the President, including the science 
adviser and the new coordinator of energy and climate policy.”244
Recognizing the importance of a coordinated effort within the 
federal government, the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
of 2009, passed by the House of Representatives, includes a 
provision for a National Climate Service.
 
245  Pursuant to Section 
452(d) of the bill, the President is required to initiate a process 
through the National Science and Technology Council and the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy to evaluate alternative 
structures to support “a collaborative, interagency research and 
operation program.”246  The goal of the program is to “meet the 
needs of decision makers” within the federal government as well 
as state, local, tribal and regional government entities and other 
stakeholders “for reliable, timely, and relevant information 
related to climate variability and change.”247  Section 342 of a 
Senate bill, introduced by Senators Kerry and Boxer on 
September 30, known as the Clean Energy Jobs and American 
Power Act, also would create a National Climate Service.248  A 
more comprehensive bill to establish a National Climate Service 
was introduced in the House of Representatives in May 2009.249
 
 244. PANEL ON STRATEGIES AND METHODS FOR CLIMATE-RELATED DECISION 
SUPPORT; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INFORMING DECISIONS IN A CHANGING 
CLIMATE 6 (2009) available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id= 
12626&page=1. President Obama appointed Carol Browner as the coordinator of 
energy and climate policy (“climate czar”) in the new White House Office of 
Energy and Climate Change Policy. Other key players on climate change within 
the Administration are Lisa Jackson (EPA Administrator), Dr. Steven Chu 
(Secretary of Energy), Nancy Sutley (Chair of White House Council on 
Environmental Quality), and  John Holdren (White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy). See Press Release, White House, President Elect Barack 
Obama Announces Key Members of Energy and Environment Team (Dec. 15, 
2008), available at http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_ 
obama_announces_key_members_of_energy_and_environmen/.  
  
Pursuant to that bill, the National Climate Service would, among 
 245. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
§ 331 (1st Sess. 2009) (as passed by the House of Representatives on June 26, 
2009). 
 246. Id. § 452(d). 
 247. Id. § 452(d)(1)(A). 
 248. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009, S. 1733, 111th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2009), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/cleanenergyjobsandameric 
anpower/pdf/bill.pdf. 
 249. National Climate Service Act of 2009, H.R. 2407, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2407. 
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other things, be charged with coordinating with federal agencies 
and collaborating with state, local, and tribal governments, 
academia, nonprofits, the private sector and other 
stakeholders.250
Whether or not a climate bill succeeds in Congress and a 
National Climate Service is established, the federal government 
must build capacity in collaborative decision making by vastly 
increasing the number of staff capable of planning and 
facilitating collaborative processes on climate change.  While 
there appears to be recognition that skilled facilitation of decision 
making processes is valuable, the benefits will not be fully 
realized without a sufficient commitment of resources.  Adequate 
funding for collaborative decision making planners and 
facilitators should be complemented by a new institutional 
structure that creates a network for coordination within the 
federal government.  The effort should take place across the 
agencies to foster both interagency coordination and outside 
stakeholder collaborative opportunities. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Institutional change can sometimes come very slowly to the 
federal government, even when new leadership has indicated a 
strong intention to shift the manner in which business is done.251
 
 250. Id. 
  
The long-standing way of making decisions through traditional 
rulemaking and other non-collaborative processes is embedded in 
agency culture and will require a significant push toward new 
approaches.  EPA has developed a template of collaborative 
processes along a continuum of increasing public involvement.  
This template can serve as a useful model as the federal 
government begins to consider the range of options for engaging 
with stakeholders in collaborative decision making on climate 
change.  Climate change-specific examples of these collaborative 
processes already exist and lessons learned from these examples 
can be a basis for exploring and successfully implementing 
additional opportunities.  In light of the unique challenges of 
climate change and specific reasons why collaborative decision 
making can be particularly helpful to government decisions on 
 251. Freeman, supra note 19, at 13-14. 
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climate change, the federal government should build its capacity 
to engage in collaborative processes.  This will require new ways 
of engaging with outside stakeholders and a new framework for 
interagency collaboration. 
 
56http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/8
